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ABSTRACT 
The achievement of a negotiated settlement in South Africa and the negotiation of a new 
constitution in the mid-1990's piqued the interest of students of conflict resolution and 
constitutional politics throughout the world. Similarly, numerous failed attempts to achieve a 
package of amendments to Canada's constitution have attracted the attention of scholars seeking 
to explain why the attempts have failed and where Canada's future lies. The purpose of this 
study was to compare the negotiations that took place in both South Africa and Canada to 
explain why South Africa succeeded in negotiating a new Constitution, whereas Canada has been 
unable to amend its Constitution despite repeated attempts. 
The study applied the social-psychological model of negotiation and bargaining to both 
cases and isolated variables in four areas to allow for a com arative analysis. The four 
dimensions of negotiation and bargaining that were explored were: (1) structural factors, (2) 
behavioural dispositions, (3) interdependence factors, and (4) social influence strategies. The 
data used for the comparative analysis was collected through a review of selected literature 
produced on the South African and Canadian constitutional negotiations. 
The results indicated that the negotiations in South Africa and Canada were both 
successful in terms of producing an agreement, however Canada failed in achieving rati'fication 
of the agreement by the populous. The independent variables in the social-psychological model 
indicated a number of areas in which South Africa had advantages over Canada in terms of 
possible success factors. The explanation of why Canada failed is rooted in a disconnect 
between the perceptions of the negotiators and the perceptions of the general public on the cost 
of failure. 
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Abstract IV 
Aside from conclusions on the reasons for Canada's failure in negotiating a new 
constitution versus Canada's success, this study makes recommendations for both South Africa 
and Canada on lessons that can be learned from each nation's experience. The author 
recommends further research into the area of comparative constitutional politics through the 
I 
investigation of further cases and the application of alternative theoretical frameworks to the 
cases examined in this study. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION 
On October 26th, 1992, Canada was confronted with one of the most significant 
threats to its national unity since it was created through Confederation in 1867. A slim 
majority (54.3%) 1 of Canadians voted against a package of constitutional amendments that 
had been the product of over two years of consultation and negotiation and had been 
supported by the federal government and all ten provincial governments, the three largest 
federal parties of the day and leaders of the business and labour communities. The 
Charlottetown Accord, which had been billed as Canada's best hope of achieving a settlement 
to the constitutional stalemate that had plagued it for decades, had been rejected by the 
Canadian population. 
Peter Russell, one of Canada's foremost constitutional scholars, has commented that 
the Charlottetown Accord "may very well be the last time this generation of Canadians 
attempts a grand resolution of constitutional issues in order to prevent a national unity 
crisis."2 While constitutional fatigue may dissuade Canadians from entering into another 
round of constitutional negotiations willingly, Russell also acknowledges that Canadians may 
be forced into another round of negotiations if Canada is confronted with an actual, rather 
than an apprehended, national unity crisis. 3 
As evidenced by the 1995 Quebec Referendum, in which of the residents of Quebec 
voted against sovereignty by a narrow margin (0.06 percent, or 54,288 votes)4, Canada's 
hold on national unity is tenuous indeed. The time may come in the not-too-distant future 
when Canada is again forced into the quest for a constitutional solution to a national unity 
1 Kenneth McRoberts and Patrick Monahan, eds., The Charlottetown Accord. the Referendum. and the Future of 
Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993, Appendix 3: Official voting results by province, 26 
October 1992. . 
2Peter H. Russell, "The End of Mega Constitutional Politics", PS 26(1) (March 1993),33. 
3 Ibid 
4 Kenneth McRoberts, Misconceiving Canada: The Struggle for National Unity (Toronto: Oxford University 
Press, 1997), xi. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 2 
cnsls. The challenge will be to either find a package of constitutional amendments that 
accommodates the concerns of French Canadians and Aboriginals or be faced with the 
consequencei- continuing national discord and potentially disintegration. 
Befo;e Canada confronts its next unity crisis, it is worth casting an eye to other 
countries that have confronted threats to their existence and have prevailed through 
negotiated s~ttlement. For those who believe! that Canada's constitutional predicament can 
not be resolv:ed, it will be useful to examine how other nations have resolved more seemingly 
intractable problems. A fitting case in point is South Africa. 
Statement oj the Problem 
The central question of this thesis is the following: 
Why did South Africa succeed in negotiating a new Constitution, 
whereas Canada has been un~ble to amend its Constitution 
despite repeated attempts? 
I 
I 
In Ol~der to answer this question, we will look at the circumstances surrounding the 
constitutional negotiations in the two countries and the views of scholars on the factors which 
led to their respective success or failure. 
I 
Intuit!ively, it would seem that Canada should have been able to solve its 
constitutional conundrum more easily than South Africa was able to resolve the devastating 
conflict in Vi;hich its inhabitants have been e~broiled for generations. Although Canadian 
I I 
authors lam~nt "the difficulty of achieving comprehensive constitutional change in a deeply 
segmented country such as Canada"S, South Africa is arguably far more deeply segmented. 
This, compounded with ongoing violence, a transition from authoritarianism, and the need to 
I 
negotiate a qew constitution from scratch, should have placed the odds firmly against South 
Africa negotiating a new constitution with greater ease than Canada. And yet on May 8th , 
5~cRoberts ~onahan, 1993,5. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 3 
1996 South Africa's Constitutional Assembly approved a new permanent constitution, 
whereas despite decades of negotiations, Canada has yet to negotiate a new constitution that 
achieves ratification. 
The prescriptive aspect of this study will be to explore whether any of the factors that 
led to South Africa's success can be employed to resolve Canada's constitutional stalemate. 
Although the original intent of this work was to determine what Canada could learn from 
South Africa's experience, as the research has proceeded it has become apparent that there are 
also lessons that South Africa can take from Canada's experience. At some point in the 
future, South Africa may contemplate constitutional change and one can only hope that South 
Africa's leaders will learn from the difficulties that Canada has encountered. 
In terms of the Canadian case, our focus will be on the period extending from the 
commencement of negotiations on the Meech Lake Accord in 1987 to the failure of the 
Charlottetown Accord in 1992. For the purposes of background information, it will also be 
necessary to look at some key constitutional negotiations from Confederation in 1867 to the 
repatriation of the Constitution in 1982. 
The scope of the South African case will cover the period from the commencement of 
the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa) in 1991 to the proclamation of the 
new permanent Constitution in 1996. Particular attention will be given to the Kempton Park 
negotiations in 1993, as this is when the interim constitution and the processes for negotiating 
the permanent constitution were agreed to. Although the negotiations around the permanent 
constitution are also interesting and were included in the research for this study, the final 
constitutional negotiations were in large part a refinement of the agreements that were at 
Kempton Park and thus the earlier rounds have been accorded greater attention. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 4 
I 
i 
Organizatio~, of the Study 
We will begin in Chapter 2 by setting. out the theoretical framework that will guide 
the study - the social-psychological approach. 
I , 
I , 
In Cryapter 3, we will discuss the metho1dology employed in this study and some ofthe 
. I 
limitations that the methodology presents. Ini particular, we will look at the historical case 
study approach, comparative analysis and the types of data collection used. 
In C~apter 4, we will begin to explore the background to the Canadian and South 
I 
African conflicts. We will undertake a historical analysis of both the Canada-Quebec 
question and, the South African apartheid question. We will then look at some of the key 
, 
political dev~lopments in both countries and examine some of the historical differences and 
i i 
similarities between Canada and South Africa. ! 
Chapter 5 will be focused on the actual :constitutional debates and negotiations in both 
countries. \}r e will apply the social-psychological approach to examine the factors which 
I 
impacted So*th Africa's political transformation and Canada's gradual political evolution and 
evaluate the impact ofthe political negotiation processes in Canada and South Africa. 
Final1y, in Chapter 6 we will summarize the key findings of this study, discuss what 
I ' 
I 
Canada and South Africa can learn from each ,other in this area and outline implications for 
~ I 
future research. 
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Chapter 2 - Theoretical Framework 5 
CHAPTER TWO - THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The complexity of the subject matter dictates the need for a theoretical 
framework to guide this study. We will be utilizing the Social Psychological 
approach as a tool to understand the "variables that may affect the course and 
character, of bargaining and negotiation at the interpersonal, intergroup and 
international Ievels."6 
This framework was chosen due to its usefulness in explaining how the 
attitudes and perceptions of the actors involved in the negotiation, including the 
negotiators themselves, the groups that they represent, and the general public, can 
influence the negotiating process. We will use this framework to argue that 
differences in the manner in which actors perceived the conflicts and potential 
solutions in Canada and South Africa are key to understanding why one nation was 
able to successfully negotiate a new constitution while the other was not. 
Rubin and Brown set out the key elements of the social psychology of 
bargaining and negotiation.7 They begin by identifying the prominent characteristics 
of a bargaining relationship as follows: 
1. At least two parties are involved; 
2. The parties have a conflict of interest with respect to one 
or more different issues; 
3. Regardless of the existence of prior experience or 
acquaintance with one another, the parties are at lease 
temporarily jOined together in a special kind of voluntary 
relationship; 
4. Activity in the relationship concerns: a) the division or 
exchange of one or more specific resources and/or b) the 
resolution of one or more intangible issues among the 
parties or among those whom they represent; 
5. The activity usually involves the presentation of demands 
or proposals by one party, evaluation of these by the other, 
6 Jacob Bercovitch, "Problems and Approaches in the Study of Bargaining and Negotiation", Political 
Science, Vol. 35, No.2 (December 1984), 129. 
7 Jeffrey Rubin and Bert Brown, The Social Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiation (New York: 
Academic Press, 1975). 
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Chapter 2 - Theoretical Framework 6 
I 
I 
I 
followed by concessions and counterproposals. The 
activity is thus sequential rather than simultaneous. 8 
Our two cases clearly exhibit these p characteristics of bargaining 
relationships. In both cases, more than two parties are involved, each having a 
I 
conflict bf interest with respect to one or more issues. These parties are J' oined I I 
, , 
together jn a voluntary relationship - as demonstrated by their participation in several 
I 
formal n;mnds of negotiations. In the case of the South African negotiations, there 
were two main parties, the African Nation~l Congress (AJ'.J"C) and the National Party 
(NP)/SoJth African Government (SAG), and a number of less central (though still 
important) parties, including the Democratic Party (DP), the Inkatha Freedom Party 
I ! 
(IFP), and the delegations from the independent homelands. In the case of Canada, 
the federal government and the 10 provinces have been permanent members of the 
I I 
: I 
constitutional negotiations, with other paities such as Canada's aboriginal peoples 
• I • JOInIng III on occasIOn. 
i 
Abtivity in both the Canadian anq South African negotiating relationships 
involves bonflict over both the division or exchange of specific resources and the 
I 
resolutio~ of intangible issues. Both nation~ have been engaged in what Peter Russell 
I 
terms mega constitutional politics and which "goes beyond disputing the merits of 
I 
specific ¢onstitutional proposals and addresses the very nature of the political 
I ' 
I . 
community on which the constitution is based. ,,9 
Tqe fact that these negotiations deal with intangible issues rather than the 
I 
exchange I of resources makes the negoti*ions themselves more complicated and 
I 
solutions more elusive. As Stein observes, "symbolic goods in constitutional matters 
I 
8 Rubin and Brown, 18. 
9 Peter Rus~ell, Constitutional Odyssey; Can Canadians Become a Sovereign People? (Toronto, 
University rToronto Press, 1993),75. 
! 
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Chapter 2 - Theoretical Framework 7 
such as charter of rights, an amending formula, or a reformed senate are more difficult 
to negotiate, since they are not readily quantifiable or divisible." 1 0 He further notes 
that intangible issues can not be measured or valued in numerical terms and then 
broken down into smaller units and allocated in an equitable manner among the 
negotiating parties. 
Finally, the activity in both cases does involve the sequential presentation of 
demands and proposals, evaluation of these demands and then concessions and 
counterproposals. In both cases, this process elapsed over a number of years and 
several rounds of negotiations, both formal and informal, were conducted. 
Dependent and Independent Variables 
The most useful aspect of the social-psychological approach for the purposes 
of the study is the identification of dependent variables (criteria of bargaining 
effectiveness) and independent variables (factors affecting bargaining effectiveness). 
Rubin and Brown set out to identify the most commonly used dependent and 
independent variables in experimental research on bargaining. The authors examine 
four paradigms - the prisoner's dilemma game, the parcheesi game, the acme-bolt 
trucking game and the bilateral monopoly game. They found that the two most 
common measures of bargaining effectiveness have been: 
1) the number of co-operative or competitive choices made throughout the 
total number of trials; and, 
2) the magnitude of the outcomes obtained by the bargainers. 11 
10Michael Stein, "Canadian Constitutional Renewal, 1968-1981: A Case Study in Integrative 
Bargaining." (Research Paper, Queen's University Institute ofIntergovernmental Relations, 1989),8. 
11 Rubin and Brown, 34. 
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The criteria for bargaining effectiveness for this study will be dealt with in 
Chapter :pive, when we apply the Social-Psychological framework to our cases and set 
out how We will define a successful constitu.tional negotiation. 
I 
R:ubin and Brown group independent variables in the social-psychological 
approach! around four underlying dimensions. The authors identify the first dimension 
as the "?tructural context within which bargaining occurS."12 Structural factors 
, 
, 
include ~uch things as the presence of audiences, the role of third parties, the 
existence of coalitions, the location of and physical arrangements at the bargaining 
site, variations in the types of threat and communication options available, time 
limitations and the duration of bargaining sessions, incentive magnitude and reward 
I 
structure, I the number of issues at stake (as well as their presentation and format), and 
the prominence of alternative solutions. 13 
T~e second dimension is "the behavioural predispositions of the parties 
involved."14 As Rubin and Brown state, "there IS little doubt that personality 
variables,! as well as other individual characteristics are important determinants of 
bargaining behaviour."15 Bercovitch refers to this set of variables as "personal 
factors" tnd argues that we can break them down into two micro-categories "a) 
I 
indi vidual characteristics (age, religion, intelligence, etc.), and b) individual motives 
I 
and attitu~es (eg. trusting, co-operative, autl;1oritarian, etc.)."16 
I 
The third dimension is "the natufe and underlying characteristics of the 
bargainers' interdependence."]7 This includes such factors as whether or not the 
participants in the negotiation are acquainted with one another, whether they have 
I 
12 Rubin an1d Brown, 34. 
13 Ibid, 37. ' 
14 Ibid, 34. 
15 Ibid 37 I 
, I 
16 BerGovitch, 130. 
17 Rubin an~ Brown, 34. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Chapter 2 - Theoretical Framework 9 
informal contact outside of the negotiating process, whether they are predisposed to 
acting in a co-operative, competitive of individualistic nature and what the 
distribution of power and dependency is in the negotiating relationship. 1 8 
Finally, there is the "use of social influence and influence strategies m 
bargaining."19 This dimension involves the effects of various strategies such as co-
operative, competitive, deterrent, rewarding, punitive and coercive.20 Complex 
analyses using these variables can involve the use of various strategies at different 
stages ofthe negotiation. 
The purpose of this theoretical framework will be to enable us to isolate 
significant variables in each of the two cases that we are examining and to compare 
these variables in order to determine similarities and differences. 
In Chapter 5, we will be using several variables in each of the four dimensions 
of the social-psychological model to analyze the South African and Canadian 
negotiations. 
18 Rubin and Brown, 38. 
19 Ibid, 34. 
20 Ibid, 39 and Bercovitch, 132. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
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CHAPTER THREE-METHODOLOGY 
H:aving established the theoretical framework for this study in Chapter Two, 
this chapter will identify the methodology to be used. 
Comparative Analysis 
! 
The primary methodological technique that we will employ in this study is 
comparative analysis. The comparative approach can be a powerful analytical tool, 
however -it is also wrought with pitfalls of which the comparativist must be aware. It 
is the int¢ntion of the author to show that a comparative analysis be useful in isolating 
some of the factors that account for the success of one constitutional negotiation and 
the failure of another. In conducting this study, however, we will remain cognisant of 
both the strengths and weaknesses of comparative analysis. 
FIrst of all, it is important to ensure that the cases being compared are truly 
comparable. We will demonstrate later in this study that in this instance, a good 
parallel exists between South Africa and Canada. The problem of comparable cases 
is comm?nly referred to as ensuring that one is not 'comparing apples to oranges'. 
More precisely, Arend Lijphart states that comparable cases must be "similar in a 
large number of important characteristics (variables) which one wants to treat as 
constants, but dissimilar as far as those variables are concerned which one wants to 
relate to each other.,,2l 
: 
One of the major potential weaknesses of our study is the fact that the cases 
are dissimilar on a number of levels. What we must ask for the purposes of this study 
is wheth~r the similarities that do exist are sufficient to warrant a comparative 
i 
I 
! I 
21 Arend L~jphart, "Comparative Politics and the c<~mparative Method", American Political Science 
Review, vol. 65 (1971), p. 687. 
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analysis of the two cases. This question will be addressed at the end of Chapter Four, 
once a historical analysis of the two cases has been undertaken. 
Another difficulty with comparative analysis is the small number of cases and 
large number of variables that are generally involved. One can question whether any 
useful generalizations can be produced from studies that focus on only two or three 
cases. Unfortunately, time and resource constraints result in almost all comparative 
analysis taking place using only a few cases. In fact, the field of comparative politics 
is dominated by single-case studies. Collier states that "this concern with analyzing 
few cases appears to derive in part from the types of large-scale political phenomena 
commonly studied by scholars of comparative politics ... a small number of cases is 
studied either because these phenomena occur relatively infrequently or because, even 
if they are more common, it is believed that they are best understood through the close 
analysis of relatively few observations."22 Indeed, constitutional negotiations are 
phenomena so complex that to undertake a comparison of more than two cases would 
necessitate either an enormous expenditure of time and resources or the limitation of 
the study to only a few variables. For the purposes of this study, we have chosen to 
limit the cases to two in order to take into consideration a larger number of variables 
while keeping the study to a manageable scope. 
We would agree with scholars who argue that studies based on a small number 
of cases can raise interesting questions and propose hypotheses that can later be tested 
through application to further cases.23 It is possible to engage in fruitful comparative 
analysis using only two cases. It is important, however, to avoid making sweeping 
22 David Collier, "The Comparative Method: Two Decades of Change", In Comparative Political 
Dynamics, Rustow and Erickson, Eds., 7. 
23 See Collier, Lijphart and Harry Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science." in 
Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 7, Fred Greenstien and Nelson Posby, eds. Reading, Mass.: 
Addison-Welsey (1975), 79-87. 
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I 
generalizations, in recognition of the fact tqat we are working from the small sample 
of only two cases of constitutional negotiations. 
T~e study of complex socio-politic;al phenomena can also present difficulties 
by necessitating either the manipulation of ~ large set of variables or the selection of a 
I 
, 
I 
smaller set of important variables. The I latter situation can result in studies that 
become unmanageable and overly descripti~e, whereas the former can result in over-
simplific~tion. 
William Sewell describes this as the problem of mUltiple causation. He 
describes two strategies that are generally tised to analyze social revolution. Analysts 
, 
either em,ploy a "hierarchical strategy" in which the primacy of one type of cause is 
asserted pver the others, or a "narrative ~trategy", which attempts to "recount the 
course of the revolution in some semblanc'e of its real complexity." We must keep 
this tension between oversimplification and overwhelming detail in mind whenever 
, ; 
we underitake analysis of complex phenomena. 
I 
Types of :Data Analysis 
The data collection for this study W;:lS undertaken through a review of selected 
literature produced on the South African and Canadian constitutional negotiations. 
Sources y.rere collected on the topics of negotiation and bargaining, the case study 
approach~ the methodology of comparative politics and the historical backgrounds of 
both South Africa and Canada. The texts of the negotiated constitutional accords and 
I 
related agreements, both ratified and rejected, were also examined. 
, , 
1-
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Limitations of the Study 
The complexity of the subject matter under question required us to put some 
limitations on the study in order to make it manageable. Due to the constraints of the 
approach that was employed, there are resulting limitations in how the conclusions 
reached in this study can be more broadly applied. As discussed above, this study is 
constrained by the problem faced in much of comparative research as we are dealing 
with few cases and an almost limitless number of variables. 
In our selection of variables for this study, we may have neglected other 
variables that also had an impact on the outcome of the cases. Although the social 
psychological approach gives us a set of variables that we feel are best suited to the 
research question at hand, the use of alternative approaches may have yielded other 
answers. We feel that with the examination of complex phenomena such as 
constitutional negotiations, the use of a theoretical framework is useful as a 
simplifying mechanism, however there is a danger that oversimplification can occur 
and the richness of the case can be lost. 
Since our study is limited to only two cases, we can not hope to achieve 
conclusions with broad applicability. Rather, it is hoped that this study will yield 
conclusions about our specific cases and raise questions that other researchers might 
examine with respect to other cases. 
Another constraint that we face in conducting this study is the fact that 
relatively little time has elapsed since the negotiation of South Africa's new 
Constitution. It is a dynamic time in South Africa and we do not have the benefit of 
sufficient elapsed time to evaluate the durability of the negotiated settlement. We 
must conduct our study with the information currently available and hope that future 
scholars re-evaluate the success of South Africa's settlement at a later date. 
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lIt terms of data collection, the study is limited by the fact that we were not 
able to access primary sources, such as conducting interviews with the parties to the 
negotiati~)lls. In lieu of direct interview~, the personal accounts of parties to the 
negotiati~ns, such as autobiographies jd published interviews, were utilized 
wherever possible. 
Definitiok of Terms 
The analysis of the South African and Canadian conflicts have occupied the 
attention i of numerous scholars and will not be the particular focus of this 
Rather, v.;e will be focussing on the efforts fO negotiate an end to the conflicts. 
it is important to be clear about what we mean by negotiation. 
work. 
Thus, 
G~liomee and Schlemmer argue that the term negotiation is contentious with 
regard to South Africa. They contend that negotiation is very widely interpreted and 
has been .used to describe everything from "the mere consultation of blacks by whites 
in regard ~o the conditions oftheir continued domination or of black's exclusion from 
power" tq "those who are interes ed only iniwhite capitulation to the demands for 
unqualified majority rule." Otto way agrees that the two sides "attached very different 
I 
meanings] to the term negotiations.,,24 
In one of the most noted texts on negotiation and bargaining in the social-
psychological tradition, Rubin and Brown treat negotiation and bargaining and 
synonym~us terms. They define bargaini*g as "the process whereby two or more 
, I 
parties attempt to settle what each shall gi~e and take, or perform and receive, in a 
transactio;n between them. ,,25 Another proposed definition of bargaining and 
24Marina O:ttoway. South Africa: the Struggle for a New Order. (Washington: Brookings Institution, 
1993),166. 
25Rubin and Brown, 2. 
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negotiation is offered by Stephenson and Morley, who state that it is "any form of 
verbal (or non-verbal) communication, direct or indirect, whereby parties to a conflict 
of interest discuss, without resort to arbitration or other judicial processes, the form of 
any joint action which they might take to manage a dispute between them."26 
Both of these definitions are useful, however the second is more appropriate 
for our study because it focuses on the management of a dispute arising out of a 
conflict of interest and specifies that the action takes place without resort to 
arbitration. This definition applies to both of the cases that we are studying without 
being overly broad. It should be noted that these definitions of terms are selective and 
contextually positioned within the parameters of the two cases - South Africa and 
Canada. 
In order to answer the central question of this study, it is also necessary to 
define what we mean by a "successful" negotiation. This definition will be set out in 
Chapter Five of this study as we begin to apply our theoretical framework to the cases 
at hand. 
We should also note, that throughout this study we have used common 
abbreviations for some of the actors in the cases being examined. This includes the 
African National Congress (ANC), the National Party (NP), the South African 
Government (SAG), the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), the Democratic Party (DP), the 
Government of National Unity (GNU) the Bloc Quebecois (BQ), the Parti Quebecois 
(PQ) and Working Groups (WG). In all cases where an abbreviation is used, the full 
term will be used in the first instance, followed by the abbreviation in parentheses. 
26Morley and Stephenson, The Social Psychology of Bargaining (London, 1977), 26 - as cited by 
Bercovitch. 
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CHAPTER FOUR - HISTpruCAL BACKGROUND 
The purpose of this chapter is to set the historical context for the constitutional 
negotiations that we will be examining. It is exceedingly difficult to understand the 
negotiations in question without being familiar with the long path that led both 
nations to the negotiating table. Thus, this chapter will provide the reader with a brief 
overview of key political events in the history of both South Africa and Canada. 
The comparison of the histories of South Africa and Canada can also help to 
address the methodological question raised in Chapter Three: Are these two cases 
sufficient~y comparable for the purposes of our study? 
Historical Analysis of the Canada-Quebec Case 
As with most societies in conflict, it is impossible to understand the political 
question~ being faced by Canada today without a basic understanding of the historical 
events th~t have led to our current predicament. In a recent book, Kenneth McRoberts 
I 
argues th~t "the roots of the present crisis [of national unity J lie in decisions made in 
I 
the 1960s".27 Others would argue that while decisions along the way have 
! 
I 
exacerba1ied the conflict, Canada's national unity crisis can be traced back to its very 
birth as alpolity. 
I 
I 
The provinces and territories that would become Canada were. confederated as 
I 
a nation I in 1867 under the British North America Act. The constitution was 
negotiated behind closed doors in Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, by twenty-
three del¢gates from New Brunswick, Nova: Scotia, Prince Edward Island and Canada. 
The dele$ations included both government and opposition members.28 
27 McRoberts, 1997, xii. 
28Russell, 1993 (1), 22. 
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The new plan for a federal union included three basic elements: a division of 
legislative powers that assigned the residual power (powers not explicitly mentioned) 
to the federal legislature rather than to the provinces, a two-chamber federal 
parliament with an elected lower house based on representation by popUlation and an 
appointed upper house based on regional equality, and a central (federal) government 
that would assume the debts and some of the assets of the provinces.29 
After the Charlottetown Conference, the Quebec Conference was held to work 
out the specifics of the British North America Act, particularly aspects of the 
constitution dealing with federalism. The constitution changed very little between the 
conclusion of the Quebec Conference and the enactment of the BNA Act by the 
British Pai-liament. 30 
The BNA Act contained a number of provisions for minority rights that reflect 
an effort to accommodate the dual visions of French and English Canadians.31 
English Canadians were given the right to use their language in the legislative and 
legal institutions of Quebec and French Canadians the right to use their language in 
the corresponding federal institutions. Protection for denominational schools, of both 
the Protestant minority in Quebec and the Catholic minority in Ontario, was also set 
out in the BNA Act. French Canada's distinctiveness was given further recognition 
through the protection of Quebec's system of civil law (in contrast to the rest of 
Canada's common law system). 
One of the major voids in the BNA Act, which would become significant in 
future years, is the lack of an amending formula. Since Canada's constitution was to 
be an imperial statute, the Father's of Confederation assumed that it would be 
29 Russell, 1993 (1), 22. 
30 Ibid, p. 26-30. 
31Ibid, p. 26-27. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Chapter 5 -" Comparative Analysis 18 
amended by the British Parliament.32 For most of Canada's history, the only route to 
an amendment of the constitution was through Westminster. 
The ratification of the BNA Act itself by the colonial legislatures was a 
political ~ather than a legal requirement. Some commentators of the day called for a 
! 
general election to be held before the enactment of the constitution to ensure popular 
I 
support, however this idea was rejected by the leading politicians.33 Peter Russell, 
one of ¢anada's foremost constitutional experts, argues that "the Confederation 
comproniise was sheltered from the strain of a fun public review in all sections of the 
I 
I 
country, put at the cost of not forming a political community with a clear sense of its 
: I 
constituent and controlling elements."34 T;his lack of public consultation, which also 
characterized the negotiation and enactmen~ of South Africa's 1997 Constitution, may 
have facilitated the creation of a new nation, however it also laid the groundwork for 
future cOllstitutional malaise. 
i 
A~though the public was not directly involved in the ratification of Canada's 
I 
Constitution, it was subject to approval by both houses of the Canadian legislature. 
Although the House of Commons approved the Constitution by a margin of 91 to 33, 
support among French-Canadians was much lower, with 27 in favour and 21 
opposed.{5 
D,bbate in the legislatures of the future Atlantic-Canadian provinces (New 
BrunswiJk, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland arid Prince Edward Island) was contentious. 
I ! 
In the en~, the legislatures of PEl and Newfoundland voted not to enter confederation 
, ' 
at that time, New Brunswick's Legislative Council (though not its elected assembly) 
32Russell, 1993 0), p. 27. 
33 Ibid, p. ~7. 
34' ' IbId, p. 47-33. 
35' I IbId, p. 28. 
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voted to enter confederation and Nova Scotia's Premier managed to manoeuvre the 
province into confederation despite widespread opposition within the province.36 
The BNA Act was passed by the British House of Commons and House of 
Lords in March 1867 and was proclaimed in effect on July 1st 1867. With a few 
amendments and additions, the BNA Act has formed the basis of Canada's 
constitution for the past 131 years. In short, Canada's Constitution was drafted 
through closed-door negotiations, was subject to a piece-meal ratification process by 
the legislatures of the day and was never put to a public referendum. By the standards 
of today, the process of confederation appears less than democratic. As Russell puts it 
"the Dominion of Canada was born, but the constitutional process that brought it into 
existence provided a thin and uncertain foundation for the birth of a people."37 
As Canada gradually evolved from a "dominion" within the British Empire to 
an increasingly sovereign nation, the challenge of re atriating Canada's constitution 
became increasingly important. The major sticking point was the inability of the 
governments of Canada, including the federal government and the provinces, to agree 
on how Canada would amend its constitution in the absence of the British Parliament. 
Conferences on this subject were held in 1935, 1950 and the early 1960's. No 
agreement was reached. 
In the mid-1960's, the issue of repatriating the constitution became entangled 
with a host of other constitutional issues, beginning the era of "mega-constitutional" 
politics in Canada. Whereas most of Canada's first century was marked with low-
level, low-key constitutional politics, the 1960's ushered in a new era in which Canada 
36 Russell, 1993 (l), 29-30. 
37 Ibid, 31. 
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attempted to reach "agreement on the identity and fundamental principles of the body 
politic."38 
Changes in Quebec, which was undergoing what historians have termed the 
'Quiet Revolution' also created the impetus: for constitutional change. Within Quebec, 
: I 
demands; were being made that the 1?rovincial government push for greater 
, 
constitutional powers for Quebec as part of the province's struggle for 
epanoui;sement, or national survival and expansion.39 
Similarly, English Canada was experiencing the birth of a new Canadian 
nationalism based on Canada's increasing prominence on the international scene as a 
"broker :;lmong nations and a peacekeeper".40 However, "unlike Quebec nationalism, 
this nationalism lacked a clearly defined notion of a people r a national society".41 
Uneasiness on the part of the federal government about the new Quebec 
nationalism led to new efforts to set a new tone in the Canada-Quebec relationship, 
including constitutional change.42 In 1964, the federal government and its ten 
I 
provincial counterparts agreed to a complex amending formula that became known as 
the "Fulton-Favreau" formula. It looked ak though the end of Canada's constitutional 
I 
repatriati;on struggle was in sight, however the agreement on an amending formula fell 
apart when Quebec withdrew its support. Quebec nationalists felt that to agree to the 
Fulton-Favreau formula would be a strategic error because it would make it more 
difficult for Quebec to achieve the constitutional changes required for nation-building. 
Iil 1968, the election of Pierre Trudeau as Prime Minister of Canada would 
introducf another change to the face of constitutional politics in Canada. Trudeau, a 
! 
38Russell, !"The End of Mega Constitutional Politics in Canada?" in The Charlottetown Accord, the 
Referendum, and the Future of Canada, Kenneth McRoberts and Patrick Monahan, eds. (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1993) 212. 
39Stein, 14. 
40 McRoberts, 1997,37. 
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charismatic figure from Quebec with a very definite vision of Quebec and its place in 
Canada, would shape constitutional politics in Canada for the next two decades. 
Pierre Trudeau was a vehement opponent of Quebec nationalism and a true believer in 
Canadian federalism. 43 During his time as Prime Minister, Trudeau opposed making 
special concessions for Quebec and favoured the creation of a bilingual nation with 
equal rights for English and French speakers throughout Canada. In a recent book, 
Kenneth McRoberts, a noted Canadian political scholar, argues that "the roots of the 
present crisis lie in decisions made in the 1960's. More specifically, they lie with 
Pierre Elliott Trudeau's 'national unity' strategy, at the centre of which was an 
attempt to implant a new Canadian identity."44 Later in this study we will argue that 
one of the most significant barriers to constitutional change in Canada has been a 
fundamental disagreement over whether our country constitutes two nations (Quebec 
and the Rest of Canada), ten equal provinces, or a number of regions (Western 
Canada, Ontario, Quebec, Atlantic Canada). 
With Prime Minister Trudeau at. the helm, a new round of efforts at 
constitutional change were undertaken. Another tentative agreement was reached by 
all provinces and the federal government in Victoria, B.c., in 1971. Again, Quebec's 
Premier withdrew his province's support for the constitutional agreement when 
nationalist opposition in the province mounted.45 The federal government remained 
committed to garnering unanimous support among the provinces for any package of 
constitutional amendments, and thus did not at this time choose to repatriate the 
constitution unilaterally.46 
41 McRoberts, 1997, 37. 
42 Ibid, 39. 
43 Ibid, 61-64. 
44 Ibid, xii. 
45 Russell, 1993(1),91 and McRoberts, 1997, 145. 
46 Russell, 1993(1), 90. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Chapter 5 ~ Comparative Analysis 22 
I 
I Between 1971 and 1980, the federal government made several attempts to 
I 
repatriate the constitution and hamper the growing independence movement in 
Quebec.47 These efforts would ultimately fail and the federal government would 
reconsider its commitment to unanimous provincial agreement. 
In 1980, the Parti Quebecois held a referendum on sovereignty for Quebec, in 
which 60% of the province's residents voted in favour of remaining as a Canadian 
provincej48 In the wake of the Quebec nationalists' referendum defeat, Prime Minister 
I 
Trudeau !moved to implement his own program of constitutional refonn. He by-
I 
passed ~he Premiers, building public support for his "People's Package" and 
I 
I 
I 
threatening to hold a national referendum.49 Only when urged to do so by the 
Supreme Court of Canada did the Prime Minister enter into negotiations with the 
provincial premiers. Trudeau made some modifications to the federal proposals and 
managed to garner the support of all of the provinces except Quebec. Despite 
Quebec's disagreement, Canada repatriated its constitution in 1982 with a new 
amending fonnula and a Charter of Rights and Freedoms.5o 
T~1Us began the modern era of Canada's constitutional politics. Despite having 
a constit*tion that now resided in the hands of Canadians, and which Prime Minister 
Trudeau ~ragged would "last a thousand years"Sl, Canada's troubles were far from 
I 
i • 
over. Many Quebecers would never forgive the federal government or the rest of 
I · 
Canada (or proceeding with repatriation Without the consent of the country's second 
I 
most pOJ?ulous province. Two major roUl1ds of constitutional negotiations have not 
I 
remedied, the situation. 
47 See McRoberts, 1997, 148-154. 
48 Ibid, 159. 
49Russell, I993(2), 214. 
50 McRoberts, 1997, 169-164. 
5 1 Pierre Trudeau, as cited in Russell, 1993(1), 127. 
I 
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It is worth noting that it is not just the province of Quebec that was opposed to 
the 1982 repatriation of the constitution. Aboriginal peoples also felt that their rights 
and interests were not sufficiently incorporated into the Constitution Act, 1982. This 
would serve as an obstacle to the ratification of the next round of constitutional 
negotiations, the Meech Lake Accord. 
The 1982 Constitution did contain a recognition that further work would be 
required to identify and define the rights of aboriginal Canadians. This led to a 
federal-provincial conference in March 1983 which produced a constitutional 
amendment that greatly enhanced the rights of aboriginal peoples. However, these 
enhanced rights fell short of "the growing constitutional aspirations of Canada's 
aboriginal peoples."52 
James Hurley strongly argues that between 1968 and 1987, "no clear pattern 
for the negotiation of multilateral discussions emerged."53 Hurley contends that the 
various constitutional rounds prior to 1987 used processes varying from multilateral 
executive federalism (in 1968-72, 1978-79 and 1980), secret bilateral executive 
federalism (1975-76), unilateral process with broad public involvement (1980-81) and 
extended executive federalism (1983-1987). Thus, there was no commonly agreed 
upon means through which constitutional amendments should be negotiated. Hurley 
urges that this must be kept in mind when assessing the Meech Lake exercise.54 
Implications - Canada's Historical Background 
We will discuss the later years of Canada's "constitutional odyssey" m 
Chapter Five. Before we address the later years, however, let us summarize briefly 
52Russell, 1993(1), 131. 
53 James Hurley, The Canadian Constitutional Debate; From the Death of the Meech Lake Accord of 
1987 to the 1992 Referendum, Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1994. p.6 
54 Ibid, 6-7. 
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some of the most important implications of Canada's historical background. 
qanada was born out of an uneasy negotiated settlement among elites. At the 
time of confederation, Canada was based: on a "double compact" between English 
Canada and French Canada.55 In future years, however, English Canadians would 
come to see Canada not as a partnership between two nations (English Canada and 
French danada), but as a union of ten equal provinces. Regionalism also played a 
i 
part, with some Canadians identifying most strongly as Western Canadians, Atlantic 
Canadians, Central Canadians (Ontario) or Quebecers. Aboriginal Canadians would 
insist th':lt they be accorded the rights ir;therent in their status as Canada's "first 
I 
nations" h.e. the first residents of the territ9ry that Canada occupies). 
If the early years of Canada's const,itutional negotiations taught us anything it 
IS that reaching agreement is exceedingly difficult. Furthermore, an agreement 
reached 1
1
hrough a process that is not seen as legitimate by one or more parties can 
I 
have negative ramifications for years to come. The less-than-democratic means 
through which Canada's first constitution was achieved have left us with a legacy of 
continuiI1,g disagreement over to fundamental questions such as "what is Canada" and 
"how shquld sUb-polities within Canada relate to one another"? 
The very fact that Canada's constitutional issues have remained unresolved for 
so many years bring use to another important point. Despite the fact that Canada's 
political leaders have been compelled on numerous occasions to enter into 
negotiations, there has never been great urgency on the part of aU parties to achieve a 
negotiated settlement. Along the way, one or more parties has always felt that the 
status quo was preferable to an imperfect settlement. We will come back to this point 
I 
55 McRob~rts, 1997, 138. 
I 
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later in this study when we answer the question of why South Africa has succeeded 
where Canada has failed. 
The "Canada-Quebec" question is a complex one and has been the subject of 
over a century of disagreement. While this study will not seek to answer this 
question, it is hoped that an understanding of the equally complex questions faced by 
South Africa and some of the steps that have been taken towards resolution of that 
nation's crisis will help Canadians to put their own national unity issues into 
perspective. 
Historical Analysis of the South African Case 
The South African constitutional negotiation is widely viewed as a "small 
miracle" for what it accomplished - "a conflict-ridden society in which neither of the 
two big blocs seemed to value democracy as a goal in itself has negotiated a 
constitutional state, with an agreed bill of rights, underpinned by a surprising degree 
of agreement on the rules for settling political differences. "56 
As "miraculous" as it was, the path to a negotiated settlement was not a direct 
one. There were numerous failed attempts to resolve the South African conflict, both 
with the assistance of third parties and without. For the purposes of our study, it is 
important to note how intractable the South African conflict seemed to many 
observers. This should offer hope to those who believe that Canada's conflict is 
irresolvable. Steven Friedman comments that "South Africa did not seem, through 
the 1980s, a likely candidate for peaceful constitutional change."57 He adds that 
strategists and conventional wisdom assumed that the only resolution for the conflict 
56 Steven Friedman and Doreen Atkinson. The Small Miracle: South Africa's Negotiated Settlement. 
(Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1994), xiii. 
57 Ibid. 
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would b~ either reform, which meant that the minority would continue to rule, or 
revolutio;n, with liberation forces overthrowing the apartheid state. Fortunately for i . 
I 
South Arca, another political option was chosen. 
T~is chapter will focus on the negotiations that resulted in a new constitution 
! I 
for South Africa. As background to thes~ negotiations, it will be necessary to look 
i 
briefly at the history of South Africa's conflict and the significant pre-cursors to 
formal c~mstitutional negotiations, including the National Peace Accord (May 1990) 
and the CConvention for a Democratic South Africa, or Codesa, (December 1991-May 
I 
I 1992). I 
dne of the most difficult aspects of telling the story of South Africa's path to a 
negotiated settlement is deciding where to begin. South Africa is a nation that has 
been embroiled in conflict of various forms virtually since its inception and the 
journey that has led to the creation of a new nation has been a long one. 
Ais in most deeply divided societies, the roots of South Africa's current conflict 
can be ~ced to its birth as a state. Rathe~ than recount South Africa's history from 
I 
the time· that Jan van Riebeck landed at the Cape of Good Hope in 1652 to the 
adoption of Apartheid as a state policy in the 1940's to the Sharpeville massacre and 
, 
the banning of the ANC in 1960, we will focus on the modem events that lead to the 
demise of Apartheid and the birth of a new state. 
, 
Alccording to some commentators, the story of South Africa's negotiated 
settlemeJt begins in Soweto in 1976. Ralph Lawrence argues that this is when 
domestic: and international resistance to Apartheid gained renewed vigour and set into 
motion a!train of events which would lead to the end of Apartheid.58 The Soweto 
I 
58 Ralph L~wrence, "Introduction: From Soweto to Codesa" in The Small Miracle: South Africa's 
Nbgotiated Settlement., Steven Friedman a~d Doreen Atkinson, eds. (Johannesburg: Ravan 
Ptess, 1994). 1-3. . 
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uprising began as a student demonstration against the use of Afrikaans as a medium of 
instruction in Soweto's schools. The uprising that emerged lasted over a year and left 
more than six hundred people dead. 
The significance of the Soweto uprising is that it produced a surge of black 
opposition, including the enlistment of an estimated 14,000 young blacks who fled to 
join the ANC in exile. 59 The death of Black Consciousness leader Steve Biko while 
in police custody in September 1977 had a similar coalescing impact on black 
opposition by heightening the resolve of the black resistance. 
In the wake of the Soweto uprising, the South African government made 
modest concessions in an effort to ease black opposition, including the recognition of 
black trade unions, the easing of the policy of job reservation, the incorporation of 
Indian and Coloured minorities with their white counterparts in a tricameral 
parliament and the elimination of some features of "petty apartheid", such as 
segregated facilities.60 These concessions were not sufficient to stem the tide of 
resistance. 
In fact, some have argued that the mobilisation of opposition grew partly 
because of, not in spite of, these reforms.61 In particular, the 1984 constitution, with 
its creation of a tricameral parliament, was "seen as a vehicle for permanent black 
exclusion,,62 and resulted in the formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF), 
which became an influential force in the fight against Apartheid. 
59 Patti Waldmeir. Anatomy ofa Miracle. London: WW Norton & Co., 1997,23. 
6ODonald L. Horowitz. A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society. 
(Berkeley: University of Cali fomi a Press, 1992), 18. and lE. Spence, ed. Change in South Africa. 
(Pinter Publishers: London, 1994),2. 
61 Lawrence, ,4. 
62Ibid. 
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i 
Rfesistance organizations emerged in the townships in the early 
I 
1980s and 
J 
adopted the goal of rendering "black areas- and presumably the whole country -
'ungovelinable' ."63 The turmoil in the townships spurred the government to the 
realizatiqn that it was losing control. 
It 1986 South Africa seemed to be on the verge of a breakthrough in settling 
I 
its ongoipg conflict. The government acknowledged that Black South Africans could 
no 10ngJ,r be denied a place in the governance of the nation. The Eminent Persons 
I 
Group ~lom the Commonwealth seemed to have pushed the government towards 
I 
negotiatirns with the ANC. Unfortunately, the conditions for settlement were not yet 
I 
right. The government was not convinced that the cost of sustained conflict 
outweiglied the cost of granting some form of meaningful political power to the black 
majority.64 
I 
I 
I 
Tlhus the conflict worsened before resolution became possible. The 
! 
gove~ent began military action aimed at ANC camps in neighbouring countries. A 
I 
state of I emergency was instituted by the government. The ANC contemplated 
! 
i 
military Istrategies which would no longer be restricted to military targets. A 
negotiatJd settlement seemed a distant hope. 
i 
quring the late 1980's, a number of domestic and international developments 
! 
would c~eate an environment in which a negotiated settlement was possible. The fall 
of communism and the continuing impact of sanctions led both the ANC and the 
governmlent to conclude that a negotiated settlement was preferable to protracted 
I 
conflict.~5 These factors will be examined in greater detail in Chapter Five. 
i 
I 
F;or some analysts, the beginning of South Africa's constitutional negotiation 
63 Friedmln et aI., The Long Journey: South Africa's Quest for a Negotiated Settlement (Johannesburg: 
I Ravan Pre~s, 1993),6. 
64 Ibid, 7.1 
65 Ibid, lOL 13. 
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process was marked by F.W. de Klerk's speech to Parliament on February 2nd, 
1990.66 In that historic and unexpected speech, the President announced the 
unbanning of the ANC and other related organizations and the release from prison of 
political prisoners, including Nelson Mandela. 
De Klerk's speech set in motion a process that would result in South Africa's 
first non-racial elections on April 27th, 1994. Although the story of how this bold 
move by De Klerk became possible is a fascinating one, the focus of this study will be 
on the events starting with the first meeting of the Convention on a Democratic South 
Africa (Codesa) in December 1991 and culminating with the proclamation of the 
permanent constitution. 
Once the South African Government and the ANC had agreed that 
negotiations towards a new South Africa were necessary and possible, the two parties 
could not agree on how a new constitution should be negotiated. The ANC favoured 
a constitution negotiated by a constituent assembly elected through universal 
franchise. The NP feared that the interests of its constituents would not be fairly 
represented by a body elected through majority rule. It favoured a multi-party 
conference as the body to draft a new constitution. This fundamental disagreement 
accounts for the nearly two-year delay before the commencement of constitutional 
talks.67 
The deadlock was broken when the ANC made a statement in January 1991 
agreeing to "an 'all-party congress' to negotiate the route to a constituent assembly."68 
Unfortunately, this breakthrough would be temporary, as the ANC broke off 
66Spence, 1. 
67Friedman et al, 1993, 14. 
681bid, 15. 
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negotiaticpns m May on the grounds that the government was complicit m the 
continuing political violence.69 
i 
Throughout the negotiations, violence would act as both impetus and obstacle. 
While th~ escalation of violence was a constant reminder to the negotiators of the 
costs of Inot reaching a settlement, it was also a source of discord and mistrust 
between the negotiators. 70 
I 
From May until September of 1991, formal negotiations were suspended. The 
foundatiqns for multi-party talks were finally laid in September when the political 
parties cqmmitted themselves to the National Peace Accord, a commitment to a joint 
peace ef~ort. Over the next few months the parties worked out the logistics of the 
negotiatilig forum, which would be called the Convention for a Democratic South 
J 
Africa. This was the end of the pre-negotiation, or "talks about talks", phase}1 
Role oft~te blternational Community 
I 
Ttrrough the 1980s and 1990s, international opposition to Apartheid steadily 
i 
grew, as bid the influence of foreign powers on South African politics. In the 1980's, 
this invo~vement primarily took the form of economic, military and cultural sanctions 
by South I Africa's major trading partners as well as direct military and financial aid to 
the liberation movements on the part of Soviet bloc nations. 72 
I 
A; more direct form of intervention was attempted m 1986 with the 
Common:\vealth Eminent Person's Group, which attempted to broker a peaceful 
69Ibid. ! 
70 i Welsh, 2~-25. 
71 Ibid, 17 .. 
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negotiated settlement between the ANC and the South African Government. 
Although the suggested course of change set out by the EPG is similar in many 
respects to the course eventually adopted, the South African Government felt that the 
price was far too high.73 It was not yet prepared to accept the concessions that would 
he required to achieve a negotiated settlement. 
Rather than accept the EPG's suggested strategy, the South African 
Government ordered raids on purported ANC camps in the neighbouring nations of 
Zambia, Zimbabwe and Botswana. The SAG's actions resulted in a strengthening of 
international sanctions against the policies of apartheid. 
Other attempts at direct intervention by various Western nations through the 
end of the 1980s were equally unsuccessful, however events in the international 
community would prove influential. Many observers agree that the weakening of the 
Soviet Union during this period both provided the ANC with added insecurity, since it 
derived a great deal of economic and military support from the Soviet bloc, and 
provided the SAG with added comfort. This assisted in drawing the parties closer to 
the negotiating table. 
Another international development that has been credited with facilitating the 
commencement of negotiations was the achievement of a settlement in Namibia. This 
both lessened the ANC's perceived military threat by eliminating ANC bases in 
Angola and proved to the SAG that "high risk diplomatic strategies could produce 
major dividends."74 The SAG's participation in the Namibian settlement also 
accorded the government some renewed status in the international community and 
72Chris Landsberg, "Directing from the Stalls? The International Community and the South African 
Negotiating Forum" in The Small Miracle: South Africa's Negotiated Settlement, Friedman and 
Atkinson, eds. Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1994.277. 
73Friedman, 1993,5. 
74Landsberg, 280. 
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created optimism In Pretoria that the government could build on this status by 
I 
beginning to negotiate with the ANe. 
E~actly what the impact of internaLonal sanctions was on pushing the SAG 
towards the negotiating table is a matter that has been debated among academics. 
What is generally agreed is that the sancti~ns and the prospect of continued isolation 
raised the! costs of the policies of apartheid. Although the sanctions themselves may 
not have been sufficient to bring about a negotiated settlement, combined with other 
, 
factors they played a role in convincing th,e SAG that the costs of not entering into 
I 
negotiati6ns were simply too high. Friedman said it well when he stated that 
sanctions !were better suited to bringing the: government to the bargaining table to its 
knees.75 , 
Tqe international sanctions were also influential in expediting the negotiation 
I ' 
process OI:ce the SAG was set in its courseitowards negotiation. The timing of F.W. 
I 
de Klerk's historic speech provides evidence of this. In October 1989, the U.S. 
I 
advised P~esident de Klerk that he would face severe sanctions unless, by early 1990, 
I 
he releas~d all political prisoners, unbanned the liberation movements and lifted the 
state of emergency. 76 De Klerk delivered a speech in which he carried out all of the 
! ! 
prescribed actions in February 1990. 
, 
According to Landsberg, the view that De Klerk's move was the direct result 
i 
I , I 
of changed international circumstances an~ foreign influence is simplistic.77 He 
argues tha,t it was domestic concerns that propelled the SAG towards negotiations, 
however pnce domestic change had beg"llll the international dimension was an 
important ,stimulus. 
75Friedman,11993, 11. , 
76Africa Confidential, October 1989, as cited by Landsberg, 280. 
77Landsberg,281. 
I 
I 
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Once the government had committed itself to negotiations, a cascade of 
crumbling sanctions and increased international contact acted as positive 
reinforcement for the South African Government. The easing of South Africa's 
isolation increased the influence of foreign governments on the actions of both the 
SAG and the ANC. This would become increasingly important as the negotiation 
process encountered setbacks. 
Besides helping to create the preconditions for negotiation and helping to keep 
the process moving along, the involvement of foreign governments in the provision of 
information to the negotiating parties proved to be enormously influential. As South 
Africans explored various models of governance, the international community helped 
to clarify options and dispel misconceptions. 
For the ANC, this involved providing information on how federalism 
functions in a number of nations throughout the world, including the U.S., Australia, 
Germany, Switzerland and Canada. The invitation of ANC negotiators to visit some 
of these nations was aimed at demonstrating that the federalist model would not 
necessarily lead to the continuance of apartheid below the national level of 
government. The United States took the extraordinary measure of expressing its 
belief that "a federal-type system seemed appropriate for South Africa,,78 because it 
believed that there was a need to clarify misconceptions about federalism in South 
Africa. 
The international community also sought to clarify misconceptions held by the 
South African Government. These misconceptions related mainly to the functioning 
of the Swiss constitutional system. A Chris Landsberg argues, "the SAG's early 
insistence that power-sharing should be enshrined in the constitution, for example, 
78The Star, 18/5/93 as cited by Landsberg, 288. 
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, 
was mot~vated by a 'clear misunderstanding of the Swiss structures, which the 
I 
internatidnal community was obliged to correct."79 
Diring the most difficult phases o~ the negotiations, there was a role for the 
internatiqnal community as monitor and, tol a lesser extent, as mediator. The violence 
in the townships provided the UN with impetus for direct intervention on' several 
occasion~. 80 International monitors under the auspices of the UN were somewhat 
I 
effective iin encouraging restraint at public demonstrations, however they were not 
able to e~d the violence or prevent large scale massacres such as that which occurred 
I 
at Bisho in September 1992. 
I 
I 
I 
The involvement of the international community in the period preceding the 
negotiati9ns and while the negotiations were occurring, helped to contribute to a sense 
of urgency in achieving a negotiated settlement and is one of the factors that we will 
point to in explaining South Africa's success. 
I i 
, ' 
Implications - South Africa's Historical B'(lckground 
\\01at are the primary implications about the South African question that we 
can draw from the historical background? First of all, we can see that the South 
African conflict has deep roots and was not easily addressed. This should be carefully 
: I 
noted byl Canadian observers who feel that Canada's historic conflicts are too 
! I 
complex and fundamental to be resolved thrjough negotiation. 
S~condly, we can see that the great shift from a negotiated settlement seeming 
I 
I 
a distant jpossibility to it becoming an attainable reality occurred largely due to a 
change i~ the perceptions of the parties to the conflict, both at the elite level and 
among general pUblic. The perceived dost of continued conflict became too high 
79 Landsberg, 288. 
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to bear and both sides became prepared to make certain concessions to bring about a 
peaceful settlement. We will examine the role of perceptions in more detail in 
Chapter Five. 
Thirdly, we would argue that the role of the international community In 
putting pressure on the negotiating parties to achieve a negotiated settlement 
increased the sense of urgency of the negotiators and of the general public and played 
an important role in keeping the negotiations from becoming derailed during difficult 
periods. 
Comparative Historical Differences 
Before we proceed with our study, it is important to address a question raised 
in Chapter Three - do our two cases have enough in common to be the subject of 
comparative analysis? Let us look briefly at some of the key characteristics of the 
two countries. 
One of the key similarities between the two countries is that they are both 
deeply divided societies. Horowitz states that "a racially and ethnically divided 
society, South Africa is polarized along ideological lines within and across racial 
groupS."81 In his book on constitutional engineering in South Africa, Horowitz makes 
a comment about South Africa that rings true for the Canadian case as well. He 
observes that 
"There is a conflict in South Africa that has something to do 
with race. That is about as far as agreement runs among many 
of the participants and interpreters of the conflict. Beyond 
that, there is disagreement over the extent to which the 
conflict is really about race, as opposed to being about 
oppression merely in the guise of race, or about nationalism 
80 Adrian Guelke, "The Development of External Mediation" in Restructuring South Africa, John 
Brewer;, ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 132. 
81 Horowitz, xii. 
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among groups demarcated by race, or about contending claims 
to the same land."82 
36 
Horowitz describes these two conflicts as the conflict itself and the 
metaconflict (the conflict over the conflict). In Canada, a divided society in which the 
primary cleavage is language rather than race, there is also disagreement over the 
nature of the conflict. Whereas the conflict is generally described as being between 
French Crnadians and English Canadians, it could more accurately be described as a 
I I 
battle ov~r nationalism, economic sovereignty, cultural self-determination, resource 
i ' 
rights and competing visions of Canada. To describe the Canada-Quebec question as 
being a debate over how best to preserv;e French-language rights while ensuring 
harmonious relations between the language groups would be a vast over-
simplificttion. Thus, in terms of disagreement over the very nature of the conflict to 
be resolv~d, Canada is quite comparable to South Africa. 
As deeply divided societies, both South Africa and Canada have experienced 
similar obstacles to the resolution of their conflicts. Pierre du Toit argues that "in 
; 
severely divided societies, there is no 'comrtlUnity of consent about the basic structure 
I ; 
of society' and 'the opposing parties do not share a common perceptual framework 
: I 
through ~hich to assess societal conflict."'8:3 This is certainly the case for Canada, in 
which there is no agreement on whether the: country should be viewed as a partnership 
between two nations (English Canada and French Canada), between three nations 
(English Canada, French Canada, Aboriginal Peoples) or between 11 governments 
(Federal land 1 0 provinces). Similarly, in South Africa there are a number of 
82 Horowid, 1. 
83Pierre dulTOit, "Contending Regime Models and the Contest for Hegemony in Divided Societies", 
1989, p. 19, as cited in Horowitz, 33. 
I • I ' 
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competing conceptions of the nature of the society. Horowitz details twelve different 
perspectives on how South Africa should be viewed.84 
The fact that South Africa is just as divided if not more deeply divided than 
Canada makes it an interesting case for comparison. Horowitz argues that, "if 
democracy endures in South Africa, more fortunately situated countries will have 
ground for greater optimism."85 We would argue that these grounds for optimism 
should extend beyond democratic consolidation. The very fact that South Africa was 
able to enter into constitutional negotiations and emerge with a document that is 
supported by the major parties to the conflict is a feat that other divided societies 
should view as a source of optimism. 
Another important similarity is the colonial history of both nations. Canada 
was formed as a result of the unification of British North American colonies in 1867. 
While most of the colonies were primarily English-speaking, one was not. The 
inclusion of Quebec as a former French colony gave Canada its unique status as a 
country born of two distinct nations. It is an aspect of Canada's identity that remains 
today. 
South Africa was also a British colony and was also born of two European 
nations. The struggle of the Afrikaner people to protect their unique language and 
culture bears much resemblance to the struggle of French Canadians. Some observers 
have drawn parallels between the Afrikaners and the Quebecois - particularly in the 
desire of some members of both groups to form a separate nation. Where the 
dissimilarities arise is in the lack of a geographical base for the Afrikaaner people vs. 
a very definite concentration of French Canadians in one province and in the 
84Horowitz, 3. 
85Ibid, xiii. 
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traditional political domination of the Afri~aaners. Although French Canadians have 
held a siknificant degree of political powJr in Canada, as demonstrated by the fact 
I ~ 
that seve~al of Canada's Prime Ministers 'and senior Cabinet Ministers have hailed 
I 
from Qu~bec, French Canadians have not enjoyed the long and continued domination 
I 
ofnation~l politics that Afrikaner politicians in South Africa have experienced. 
, 
yiet another similarity between the two countries is the oppression of its native 
and disadvantaged peoples. This oppression took different forms in Canada and 
South AErica, however both nations will deal with its consequences for generations. 
Sheer numerical differences - aboriginals make up only 3% of the Canadian 
populatidn86, whereas black Africans make up 76.7% of South Africa's population8? -
dictates that the paths of native peoples in Canada and South Africa will be different 
ones. There is little chance that Canada's native peoples will find themselves at the 
helm of the country as blacks have in South Africa. There are, however, marked 
I 
similaritips in the issues being faced by native peoples in both nations and the 
, 
, 
, 
strugglesithat they have undergone to gain recognition of their rights. 
I 
I 
This brings us to the question of: what are some of the important differences 
between our two cases? 
In the case of South Africa, the degree of constitutional change being 
; . 
contempl,ated was much more dramatic thait in the case of Canada. Whereas Canada's 
. ! . 
i 
negotiati6ns have dealt with a package of atnendments to the existing Constitution 
Act, 1982, which was itself the result of ainendments to Canada's first constitution -
I : 
the Britifh North America Act, 1867, ~outh Africa's negotiations concerned an 
entirely ~ew constitution that would radiCal~y alter the country's political and legal 
I ! 
I I 
86 Statistic~ Canada, 1996 Census: Aboriginal Data: Press Release, January 13, 1998. Note-
AbOriginallinc1udes North American Indian, Metis ~nd Inuit. 
8? Statistict South Africa. Census in Brief; Population Census, 1996. (Pretoria, 1998) 
i 
I 
I 
I 
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system. 
To complicate matters further, South Africa's negotiation concerned not only a 
new constitution, but also a democratic transition. Although it is difficult to classify 
the apartheid regime, it was certainly not a democracy. Samuel Huntington 
convincingly argues that South Africa was a type of authoritarian state - "a racial 
oligarchy with more than 70 percent of the population excluded from politics but with 
fairly intense political competition occurring within the governing white 
community."gg The transition to a democratic regime that began with the 1994 
elections will continue for several years. The fact that South Africa was 
simultaneously undertaking this transition and negotiating its new co stitution added 
a complication which Canada has not had to face. Since Confederation Canada has 
been a Liberal Democracy and it is a virtual certainty that no negotiated settlement 
would change this. 
Finally, South Africa's negotiation involved the transfer of power from a 
ruling white minority to the black majority. In Canada, there will not be a wholesale 
transfer of power between ethnic or linguistic groups. In the negotiations that have 
occurred to date there have been provisions to increase the rights and powers of 
French Canadians and Canada's aboriginal people, however the existing balance of 
power between ethnic and linguistic groups would remain unchanged .. 
We would argue that while we must remain cognizant of the significant 
differences that exist between our two cases, there are enough similarities to merit the 
use of comparative analysis. Both Canada and South Africa are deeply divided 
societies with a commitment to finding a constitutional solution for their conflicts. 
Both countries have similarities in their historical backgrounds. As we will see later 
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in this study both nations utilized negotiating structures that were similar in many 
respects. The differences in the circumst'lnces surrounding the negotiations and the 
I 
results t~at they yielded will be useful in r~ising some issues for discussion and some 
, I 
I ! 
questions that merit further study. 
I 
88 SamueliHuntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (University 
of Oklahoba Press, 1993) p. 111. (my emphasis) 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Chapter 5 - Comparative Analysis 41 
CHAPTER FIVE - COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
Now that we have examined the theoretical framework and methodology for 
the study, as well as the salient points of historical background for both of our cases, it 
is time to turn to the negotiations themselves. 
In this chapter, we will begin with a brief discussion of the constitutional 
negotiations in South Africa and Canada. We will then examine more closely some 
of the key factors accounting for the degree of success attained in each of the 
negotiations. For this latter exercise, our theoretical framework will be the social-
psychological approach to negotiation and bargaining. 
South Africa's Constitutional Negotiations 
CODES A 
At its inception in December 1991, the Convention for a Democratic South 
Africa (CODESA) was a source of great hope and optimism for those South Africans 
committed to a negotiated settlement. Unfortunately, CODESA would also lead to 
great disappointment as this round of negotiations floundered and came grinding to a 
halt in June 1992.89 
CODESA marked the beginning of serious discussions. At last the pre-
negotiation manoeuvrings were over and the negotiating parties were .ready to discuss 
the details that would lead to an agreement on the shape of a new 
South Africa. As Ralph Lawrence states, "leaders dotted along the ideological 
spectrum were now prepared to trade views."90 
89 Friedman, et ai, 1993, 31. 
90 Lawrence, 9. 
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Ii'The chief parties in this round of n1gotiations were the ANC and the South 
African government, however other parties were invited to participate in the process. 
I 
I 
This lea~ to complications that had not been faced during bilateral negotiations. 
I 
~he convention was co-chaired by two judges, one black (Ismael Mohamed), 
one whi~e (Piet Schabort). The participants in the plenary of the convention included 
representatives of 19 parties, including the ANC, the South African Communist Party, 
the Tran~vaal and Natal Indian Congressef, the National Party, the Inkatha Freedom 
Party, the Democratic Party, five ,parties which controlled "homeland" 
administrations, three parties from the national tricameral parliament and the four 
TBVC (,'independent homeland") administrations. The South African Government 
, ' 
sent a delegation that was distinct from the NP's delegation, however NP cabinet 
ministerJ dominated both delegations.91 The parties not participating in Codesa 
includedlparties of the far right (the Consetvative Party, the AWB and the HNP) and 
the left (AZAPO). ! . 
Structur, of Codesa : 
It1was at the first session of Codesa iCCodesa 1), that the procedural rule known 
as "suffiCient consensus" was first introduced. Sufficient consensus was reached 
I 
I 
when en?ugh organizations were in agreGment to allow the process to proceed.92 
Althoug~ there were some efforts to ensurb that the views of smaller non-consenting 
I 
organizat~ons were taken into account, essentially sufficient consensus meant that if 
I 
I 
the ANG and the SAG agreed, the pr~cess would continue.93 The Sufficient 
91 Friedmanl et aI, 1993,23. 
I 
92 David Wielsh, "Negotiating a Democratic Constitution" In Change in South Africa, 22-49. 1. E. 
Spence, ed.! (London: Pinter Publishers, 1994),26. 
93 La""nr 10. 
I 
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Consensus rule would remain in effect throughout Codesa and the Kempton Park 
negotiati ons. 
Codesa 1 appointed five working groups to "prepare the way to a second 
plenary."94 Much of the real bargaining at Codesa took place within these working 
groups. Within each working group, the parties participating in Codesa were each 
represented by two delegates and two advisors. The working groups covered the 
following areas: 
1) creation of a free political climate 
2) constitutional principles and a constitution-making body 
3) transitional or interim government 
4) reincorporation of the TBVC states 
5) time frames for implementation of agreements 
It should be noted that the subject areas that these working groups were 
organized to address were related more to the mechanics of the transition than to the 
issues that would be covered by the new constitution. One of the unfortunate 
consequences of this division of labour is that some working groups (WGs), such as 
WG 1 were overwhelmed with the range of issues that they were expected to address, 
whereas others, such as WG5 had little to do.95 
The working groups were supplemented by a Gender Advisory Committee, a 
Daily Management Committee and a Secretariat. One participant of the Working 
Groups commented that the process within them was slow and "highly ritualized", 
with "no sharp focus on fundamental issues and little cut and thrust of debate on the 
position of a particular party ... 96 Each participant was given a chance to present its 
position on every agenda item. From the standpoint of an ANC member, it appeared 
that an inordinate amount of time was spent on presentations by parties with very little 
94Friedman et ai, 1993,25. 
95Ibid,32-33. 
96Frene Ginwala, "Into and Out of Codes a Negotiations: the View from the ANC", 20. 
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popular support.97 Once the presentations had been made, a Steering Committee of 
the working group would produce a draft formulation as a basis for consensus, which 
would then be discussed. 
Alliances 
I 
I 
~here was an effort on the part o~ the two main negotiating parties to forge 
i 
I 
alliances
l 
with smaller parties. In particulaf, the NP tried to counter its lack of popular 
support !by forging "a stable anti-ANC coalition"98 with conservative parties, 
homeland leaders and the IFP - anyone with an interest in avoiding majority rule by 
the ANt. Neither the ANC nor the NP was particularly successful in building 
I 
i 
coalitions, as "many of the smaller Codesa parties remained uncommitted, afraid of 
compromising their future by turning to the losing side. ,,99 As a result, no stable 
coalition:s emerged during Codesa. 
Although the purpose of Codes a was not to draft a constitution but to prepare 
I 
the way for a constitutional convention, there were great expectations for the outcome 
, I 
of the conference. 1 00 Unfortunately, the end of Codes a brought little in the way of 
I 
I 
concretel agreements. Friedman argues th~t the reason for Codesa's deadlock "lay not 
in the c~nvention's presumed flaws but i~ the reality that the parties were not yet 
, ' 
i 
ready to i agree." 1 0 1 Ottoway agrees that ,the parties were too far apart at Codesa to 
I 
have come to an agreement. She contends that the conference was "built on the shaky 
foundatipns of conflicting goals, misunderstandings and lack of good faith." 1 02 
I 
97G' 1: 2 Inwa a" o. 
980ttoway, 165-66. 
99lbid, 164. 
lOoPreidman et aI, 1993, 172. 
IOllbid,l72. 
1020ttow~y, 158. 
I 
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Whatever reason for Codesa's collapse, the period immediately following was 
one of the most difficult periods that South Africa has known. As one commentator 
noted "all the fault lines in South African Society and Politics which had been 
papered over during Codesa became evident, revealing the potential for prolonged 
instability well into the future." 1 03 What had begun as a cordial relationship 
between Mandela and De Klerk soured during Codesa and by mid-1992 Mandela had 
broken off the negotiating relationship entirely. For three months their exchanges 
were limited to angry memoranda. l 04 
During this time, the only line of communications was between the chief 
negotiators for the ANC and the NP, Cyril Ramaphosa and RoelfMeyer, who became 
known simply as "the channel." This relationship has been credited with ensuring that 
the negotiations did not stagnate during the period when formal negotiations had 
ceased. 
Formal negotiations resumed with the Record of Understanding, which 
included a concession by the South African Government (SAG) that the final 
constitution would be drafted by an elected constitution-making body and ANC's 
concession that the constitution-making body would be bound by a set of 
constitutional principles that would be agreed to by a multi-party negotiating process. 
The Record of Understanding also laid the groundwork for an interim government of 
national unity (GNU) and an interim constitution. The IFP was angered by the 
Record of Understanding, which it saw as an "implicit assumption of 
ANC/government hegemony." 1 05 
I03Friedman et aI., 1993,177. 
I04Welsh, 24. 
105Ibid, 26. 
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I 
1lthough Codesa succeeded in allowing the major negotiating parties to "feel 
each ottr out", it wasn't until the 19931 negotiations that the bargaining became 
concem1d with the details of the new POlitical system.! 06 Little had been settled at 
Codesa, however the precedents which were set at that bargaining venue carried over 
to the nefw round of negotiations and helPL to keep the process moving along. The 
I i I 
issues t~at had been on the agenda at Cbdesa were also carried over to the 1993 
I I 
negotiatipns, although they were dealt with in greater detail at the latter. 
I : 
~he transition process agreed to in the 1992 Record of Understanding was a 
two-stag~ process. In the first phase, a [non-elected, multi-party negotiating body 
would dlft an interim constitution. This constitution would remain in place while a 
i I 
permaneht constitution was negotiated by an elected constituent assembly. The 
I i 
constitu1nt assembly would be constraine~ by a set of pre-determined constitutional 
I ! 
prinCiPlt.! 07 I 
h .. 1 d' 1 e structure of the 1993 negotlatI'ons Iffered somewhat from Codesa. The highest i ecision-making body was the PI~nary, with ten delegates per party. The 
arena f01 debate was the negotiating council, which consisted of the chief negotiator 
and one ~dvisor from each party. The planning committee often played a facilitation 
I I 
role and I kept the process moving along. I Finally, technical committees organized 
accordink to issue areas, much like wdrking groups at Codes a, ,met to receive 
I I 
I i 
submissirns from the parties and transform them into proposals. 1 08 
I ! 
11he structure of the 1993 negotiatiqns in South Africa was designed to counter 
CriticisJthat Codesa had excluded smaller!parties and the public. In particular, the 
I 
l06Friedmkn and Atkinson, 1994, xii. ! 
l07DoreenlAtkinson, "Principle Born ofPragmatisni?" in The Small Miracle, Friedman and Atkinson, 
ed. (Ravan Press: Pretoria, 1994),94. . 
I 08Doreenl Atkinson, "Brokering a Miracle" in The Small Miracle, Friedman and Atkinson, ed. (Ravan 
Press: Preioria, 1994), 24. 
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negotiating council was meant to allow the public to view the debate. This masked 
the processes ongoing below the surface, such as the planning committee, which met 
privately and did not publish its minutes. According to Doreen Atkinson, the 
planning committee became the "'black box' where the process was steered, and 
c.rucial agreements reached. 1 09 Atkinson credits the "subcommittee" of the planning 
committee, consisting of representatives of the SAG, ANC and IFP with even greater 
influence. 
Atkinson argues that the 1993 process was both more open than that of Codesa 
and also more closed. She offers as an example the use of bosberaad - private 
meetings between important negotiating partners in undisclosed, remote venues to 
resolve critical issues. 11 0 Although the public was allowed to view some aspects of 
the negotiating process, the most important negotiations occurred behind closed 
doors. 
Participation in the Multi-Party Negotiating Process was broader than Codesa. 
The Codesa parties were joined by the PAC, the Kwa-Zulu government, traditional 
leaders from the Transvaal, Orange Free State and the Cape, the Conservative Party 
and the right-wing Afrikaner Volksunie (A VU). "If the organizations present at 
Codesa represented over 80 per cent of the future electorate, those participating in the 
MPNP increased the figure to virtually 100 per cent." III Welsh points out that this 
broader inclusion made consensus more difficult to obtain. I 12 The tendency was for 
the ANC and the NP to proceed once they were in agreement, since "sufficient 
consensus" had been attained, however some organizations were regular dissenters 
109 Atkinson, 24. 
IIOIbid,24. 
"'Welsh, 26. 
I 12 Welsh, 26-27. 
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, , 
and claimed that they had been steamrolled during the negotiations. 
In the end, the pressure of the coming elections caused the approval of the 
constitution by 22 organizations at Kempton Park and the adoption of the draft 
constitution by parliament to be rushed. A$ a result, the interim constitution has been 
called "a messy and inconclusive document, the result of inevitable 
compromises."ll3 
A!lthough the adoption of an interim constitution can be considered the most 
! 
significal~t accomplishment in South Africa's "small miracle", the story does not end 
I 
I 
here. O~ce the interim constitution was adopted, the work of drafting a permanent 
documen!t began. The analysis in this study will focus on the negotiations leading to 
the interim constitution, however to ensure the proper context we will briefly describe 
the structure of the negotiations leading to the permanent constitution. 
As well as setting out provisions for the governance of South Africa during the 
interim period, the 1993 constitution listed 34 Constitutional Principles upon which 
the permanent constitution would be based. 114 It further dictated that the new 
constituti;on would be negotiated by a Con~titutional Assembly comprised of the 490 
, 
I 
members: of the National Assembly and Senate. The permanent constitution would be 
I ' 
I I 
drafted apd approved within two years. Tjo avoid deadlock, the interim constitution 
I I 
was ve~l· specific about the ratification pr~cedures that would be employed and the 
optIOns t I at would be avaIlable If ratlficatlqn was not Immedlately forthcommg. 
Like the rounds of negotiations thai preceded it, the Constitutional Assembly 
divided ts members into sub-groups, Jlled "theme committees". Each theme 
! I 
I I 
. I 
committ~e was comprised of 30 members, representing the parties proportionally. 
I 
I 
I 13Welsh, ~3. 
114 Schedul~ 4,1993 Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
www.constitution.org.za!1993cons.htrn#SCHEDUL4 
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From among the committee membership, three chairpersons and a core group of 7 or 
8 persons was selected to co-ordinate the work of the committee. According the 1996 
I 
annual report of the Constitutional Assembly "Theme Committees were tasked with 
receiving and processing the views of political parties and the broader community and 
compiling reports for discussion in the Constitutional Committee."115 Each Theme 
Committee was assigned a technical committee of four advisors to give technical advice 
and assist in compiling reports. 
Theme Committees covered the following areas: 
(1) Character of the Democratic State 
(2) Structure of Government 
(3) Relationship between Levels of Government 
(4) Fundamental Rights 
(5) Judiciary and Legal Systems 
(6) Specialised Structures of Government 116 
The Constitutional Committee was composed of 44 members, representing 
political parties proportionally, and was mandated by the Constitutional Assembly with 
negotiating the constitutional text. The size of the committee became unwieldy, 
however, and a sub-committee of 20 members was appointed in June 1995. The sub-
committee had no direct decision-making ability - it reported to the fun Constitutional 
Committee. The smaller size and the ability of the members to meet frequently made 
the sub-committee a very effective body. 1 17 A unique feature of the sub-committee is 
that it was comprised of some permanent members and some ad-hoc members who 
were invited when particular subjects were being discussed. 
115 Annual Report, 1996. Constitutional Assembly. www.constitution.org.za/ca95_96.htm 
116 Ibjd. 
117 Ibid. 
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I ~ost of the negotiations took place in the Theme Committees and the 
I 
Constitutional Committee (and sub-Committee). The plenary of the Constitutional 
,
Assembly met only 4-5 times per year. 
Other structures that were part of the constitutional drafting and negotiation 
process ihcluded an Independent Panel of Constitutional Experts, the Commission on 
. , 
Provinci~l Government and the Volkstaat Council. The Independent Panel of 
Constituttonal Experts was tasked with playing a role in conflict resolution to avoid 
deadlocks between parties. It also advised the Constitutional Assembly on matters 
I 
dealing ~ith the functions of the assembly.118 The Commission on Provincial 
, I 
Gove~ent was tasked with bringing abodt provincial governments as outlined in the 
I I 
i 
I 
interim constitution. The Volkstaat Council was established to enable proponents of a 
I i 
I , 
Vo1kstaa~ to pursue its establishment constitutionally. The Constitutional Assembly 
I 
I I 
was succ¢ssful in fleshing out the principles ;established in the interim constitution. 
I I 
Alfter almost two years Ofnegotiati01s, South Africa's permanent Constitution 
was adOP[ted by the Constitutional Assembly. on May 8th, 1996. Although these final 
years spe t negotiating the details of South Africa's constitution were undoubtedly 
difficult, these negotiations were greatly facilitated by the groundwork of earlier 
negotiatilns that led to the interim Constitutlon. As Nelson Mandela said in his speech 
on AdoPt~on Day, "long before the gruel1in~ sessions of the final moments, it had 
been agrted that once and for all, South A~ca will have a democratic constitution 
based on Ithat universal principle of democrhtic majority rule. Today, we formalise 
this consinsus. As such, our nation takes th~ historic step beyond the transitory 
! 
118 Ibid. 
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arrangements which obliged its representatives, by dint of law, to work together 
across the racial and political divide. "119 
Canada's Constitutional Negotiations 
In Chapter Four, we examined the path that Canada followed from the 
adoption of the British North America Act in 1867 to the repatriation of the 
Constitution in 1982. We will now turn to the structure of the negotiations that 
Canada's political leaders pursued leading to the Meech Lake Accord in 1987 and the 
Charlottetown Accord in 1992, neither of which was successful in either resolving 
Canada's conflict or in amending the constitution. 
Meech Lake Accord 
The Meech Lake Accord was aimed at addressing Quebec's exclusion from the 
1982 agreement to amend and repatriate the constitution. 120 Whether it was wise of 
the federal government, led by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, to attempt to resolve 
this issue rather than to let the Quebec problem fade away through "benign neglect" is 
a matter of debate among Canadian political scientists. 121 What is generally agreed 
is that the failure of the Meech Lake Accord left the country more deeply divided than 
at any time in its history. 
Kenneth McRoberts argues that it was the departure of Pierre Trudeau from 
the political scene in the spring of 1984 that opened the door to pub lic consideration 
ofthe need to repair the damage caused by the 1982 repatriation of the Constitution 
119 Nelson Mandela's Address on the Adoption of the New Constitution, May 8, 1996. 
www.constitution.org.za/sp0508.htm 
120Stein,43. 
121Russell, 1993(1), 127-128. 
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I 
I 
I 
without Quebec's consent. 122 Another significant event was the defeat of the Parti 
I 
I 
Quebecoiis government by Liberal leader Robert Bourassa,123 which gave the rest of 
! 
Canada cfluse to believe that Quebec might be willing to negotiate. In May 1986, 
Quebec's: Minister ofIntergovernmental Affairs, Gil Remillard, presented to a.small 
I 
group of hcademics, government officials, journalists and business representatives 
. I 
gathered ~t a ski resort north of Montreal, 124 five conditions under which Canada's 
constitut¥n would be acceptable to Quebec: 
1. A veto over constitutional change affecting Quebec; 
2. Recognition of Quebec's status as a distinct society; 
3. Limitation of the federal spending power; 
4. Participation in Supreme COllrt nominations; and, 
5. Recognition of Quebec's existing powers in immigration. 125 
T~ese conditions were viewed as the most reasonable proposals for 
constitutipnal change to have corne out of any Quebec government in decades and 
I 
I 
they signklled Quebec's willingness to return to the bargaining table. 126 Rather than 
I 
! 
put the p~oposals out for public consultation, a decision was made to develop them 
through duiet diplomacy. Peter Russell views this closed and elitist approach as a 
sign of h~w out of step the consti utional aficionados were with the general public and 
! 
he argueJ that this approach contributed to the negative response that eventually came 
I 
! 
from the test of Canada. 127 The exercise was to shape Quebec's demands into 
constituti!onal proposals that could be supported by an the provinces. Russell calls it 
I 
I 
"a classiC; exercise in elite accommodation."128 
122 McRob:erts, 1997, 190. 
123 Joint Cpmmittee ofthe Senate and the House of Commons on the 1987 Constitutional Accord, 
Constitutiopal Chronology, 1926-1987. 
www.solon.org/Constitutions/CanadalEnglisbJCmru:nittees/Meech_Lake .. .!mlr-chl.htm 
124 RusseUlI993(1) 133. 
125 McRoHerts, 1997, 191. 
126 Ibid. I 
127 Russell, 1993(1), 134. 
128 Ibid, 135. 
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The groundwork for the Accord was laid through tours of provincial capitals 
during the summer of 1986 by both Quebec officials and federal officials, focussed on 
the five-point proposal. 129 The final negotiations took place at the end of April 1987 
at the government's conference centre on Meech Lake, just outside of Ottawa. This 
final meeting was between the 10 Premiers and the Prime Minister only. Other 
provincial ministers and advisors were not permitted to participate in the negotiations. 
The provinces were allowed only a single notetaker among them. The theory behind 
these restrictions was that the limitation of direct participation to the first-minister 
level would maximize the instinct for compromise and the chances of achieving an 
agreement. 130 Most major federal-provincial decisions in Canada were reached 
through a form of elite accommodations known as executive federalism, however it 
was unusual to limit negotiations to include only first ministers and to not allow any 
advisors to participate. 
Although the first ministers emerged from the meeting at Meech Lake 
victorious, the Accord would not achieve ratification. One of the fatal flaws of the 
Accord was that it did not specify a timetable for ratification. The default timetable 
was one specified in the constitution - once a resolution to ratify a constitutional 
amendment is passed by one provincial legislature, the other provinces have a 
maximum of three years to adopt similar ratifying resolutions. As Richard Simeon 
points out, this three year process "made it virtually inevitable that a number of 
elections would have been held and thus that governments not part of the initial 
129 McRoberts, 1997, 192. 
130 Patrick Monahan, "The Sounds of Silence" in The Charlottetown Accord, the Referendum and the 
Future of Canada. Kenneth McRoberts and Patrick Monahan, eds. (University of Toronto Press: 
Toronto, 1993),229. 
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, 
bargaininig, and not committed to its success, would have been elected." 131 That is 
I 
precisely.what occurred. 
Wf:thin a year of the first ministers agreeing to the Meech Lake Accord, it had 
I ' 
I , 
been ratified by a strong majority in the federal parliament (242-16) and positive 
54 
: I 
votes in 8 of 10 provincial legislatures, 132 :It initially enjoyed a 56% approval rate in 
public opinion polls. 13 3 This ini tial level of support begs the question of what caused 
the accor!l to not achieve ratification within three years. 
Orlposition to Meech was initially ba~ed outside of Quebec. English Canadians 
resented ~he concept of a round of constitut~ona1 change that was devoted to Quebec's 
constitutibnal demands and ignored the con~titutional changes favoured in other parts 
ofthe country. 134 The Accord was also attacked by special interest groups, who had 
been inclfded in Parliamentary hearings on the subject of constitutional change in 
1982 and; felt excluded by the closed negotiations at Meech Lake. 135 Cairns argues 
that the fi~st ministers did not understand the fact that the introduction of the Charter 
of Rights in 1982 had transformed what had been a government's constitution into a 
citizen's constitution. 136 Ru sell argues th~t the negotiators did not anticipate the 
difficultyiof combining the traditional practice of executive federalism with the new 
! 
requirem~nt of legislative ratification as set out in the 1982 amending formula. 13 7 
I 
131 Richard iSimeon as cited in Russell, 1993(1), 141 
132Christopher Manfredi, "Politics of Constitutional Modification", Law and Society Review, Vol 31, 
No.1, 1997, 123. ' 
133lbid, 123. 
I 
134Russell,iI993(1) 142. 
135Stephen.Brooks, "Consent and Constitutional Change in Canada." Journal of Commonwealth & 
Comparati~e Politics, Vol 32, No.3, November 1994,293. 
136 Alan Cairns. "Citizens, Scholars and the Canadian Constitution." International Journal of Canadian 
Studies, V91. 12, Fall 1995. 285-289. 
I37Russell,1993(2), 35. 
I 
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AU of this public discontent translated into pressure on the provinces that had 
not yet ratified the Meech Lake Accord. By the end of 1988, only two provinces -
New Brunswick and Manitoba - had not ratified the Accord. In both of these 
provinces, elections held after 1987 replaced the governments that had signed the 
Accord with new governing parties. Another province in which a pro-Meech 
government was replaced by an administration that opposed the Accord was 
Newfoundland. All three of these provinces would present threats to the ratification 
process in the years leading up to the deadline. 
By the time the allotted period for ratification had run out in the Spring of 
1990, the Meech Lake Accord was strongly opposed by a majority of Canadians 
outside Quebec yet had been ratified by all but two provincial legislatures. 138 This 
discord between popular opinion and the support of provincial legislatures 
foreshadowed of the difficulties that would be faced when the Charlottetown Accord 
was put to a referendum 2 years later. No public hearings on the Meech Lake Accord 
were held in Saskatchewan, Alberta, Nova Scotia, British Columbia, Newfoundland 
and Quebec. 
The failure of the Meech Lake Accord has been blamed on both substance and 
process. The Jack of public involvement, the indivisibility of the package of 
amendments, the constraints of unanimity and the three-year time limi.t were aU 
aspects ofthe process that were criticized. The substance of the Accord was felt by 
many to be too narrowly focussed on Quebec's demands. Outside of Quebec there 
was a desire to be comprehensive and inclusive in constitutional negotiations. 139 
138Russell, 1993(1),215. 
139 Hurley, 10. 
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CharlottJtown Accord 
After the failure of the Meech Lake Accord, Prime Minister Mulroney 
I 
56 
committed himself to a more inclusive process for the next round of negotiations. In 
i 
response to public feeling that the Meech Lake Accord had been focussed too 
narrowly pn meeting the concerns of Quebec, this next round of negotiations was 
. I ' 
deemed tile "Canada Round". The intent w~s to consult widely and negotiate a deal 
that would accommodate the aspirations of all Canadians - a daunting task. 
The Canada Round began with the establishment ofthe Spicer Commission in 
Novemb~~ 1990. The Citizens Forum on C~nada's Future, chaired by Keith Spicer, 
I ' 
. I 
was mandated with consulting broadly with Canadians and communicating their 
concerns. The commission consulted with over 600,000 Canadians and issued its 
report in ~une 1991. The main conclusion of the Spicer Commission was that 
i 
Canadians were disenchanted with elected politicians. The focus was on calling for 
new proc~sses rather than the substance of Canada's constitutional development. 140 
I 
A second committee, the 'Beaudoin-Dobbie Committee, was established in 
Septembe~ 1991 to consult with the public dn the government's first set of draft 
constituti<,mal proposals. The committee ran into difficulties due to public scepticism 
I 
I 
I 
and indifference, however its credibility was salvaged when the government 
announced five constitutional conferences on various elements of the federal I . 
I 
proposals.1 41 The conferences involved "ordinary Canadians", interest groups and 
politicians. The Beaudoin-Dobbie Committee submitted its report on February 28th, 
1992, andl so ended the public consultation phase of the Canada Round. 
I 
TJe next phase of consultations was similar to the executive federalism model 
that Canada has traditionally employed in constitutional negotiations. Patrick 
140 Hurley,I5. 
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Monahan argues that this reversion to "elite accommodation" in the final stages of the 
Canada Round was a virtual necessity given Canada's current amending formula. 142 
Since the provinces must agree to any constitutional change, provincial government 
support for any proposed constitutional package is a necessity. Monahan argues that 
the only way to ensure provincial "buy in" is to ensure that governments are the key 
players in the final stages of the process. 
The final stage of the Canada Round was known as the multilateral 
negotiations. In contrast to Meech Lake, the provincial delegations at these meetings 
included ministers and their advisers and the entire process was chaired not by the 
Prime Minister, but by Constitutional Affairs Minister Joe Clark. The meetings were 
held between the 12 of March and the 7th ofJuly, 1992. 
During the final stage of the Canada Round, the heads of the provincial, 
federal and aboriginal delegations formed a committee known as the Multilateral 
Meeting on the Constitution (MMC). The MM  created four working groups, on the 
following issue areas: unity and diversity; central institutions; aboriginal matters; 
roles and responsibilities. These working groups were composed of officials from the 
various delegations, who would outline options and make recommendations to the 
Co-ordinating Committee on the Constitution (CCC), which was composed of senior 
officials. The CCC would then present options to the MMC (ministers and heads of 
delegations), who would either take a decision or refer the matter back to the officials 
for further work. The First Ministers Meeting on the Constitution (provincial 
Premiers and the Prime Minister), from the 4th to the 28th of August was the forum 
for final decisions. 
141Monahan, 225. 
142Ibid,226. 
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I 
I ' 
This process afforded officials a mubh greater role in the process than they had 
! 
during the Meech Lake meetings. The involvement of officials had been avoided 
I • 
during Meech due to the fear that they woultl "render the process cumbersome, 
bureaucr~tic and inefficient" and that they would be more inflexible than their elected 
I ' 
, I 
counterpa;rts. 143 In the case ofthe Canada Round negotiations, the inclusion of 
I 
officials ~id complicate the process and ma~e it more time consuming, however the 
, ' 
, ' 
process yielded unanimous agreement in the end. 
I 
I I 
M~nahan attributes the success ofth~ multilateral negotiations to three factors. 
, I 
First of all, he argues that the role played by the federal government in this round was 
I 
as a facili{ator rather than a negotiating party with a coherent strategy and bottom-line 
, , 
objectives:. 144 It appeared that the primary objective of the federal delegation was to 
achieve a lettlement. Despite the flexibility idemonstrated by the federal government, 
it should Je remembered that it was an interested party rather than a neutral facilitator. 
! i 
A second success factor identified by Monahan is the absence of Quebec from 
the early s!tages of the negotiation process. The absence of Quebec both narrowed the 
I I ' 
: I 
differences around the table and ensured that on two controversial issues (Senate 
I 
reform anl1l Aboriginal self-government), the, provinces who found themselves in the 
! • 
minority djd not receive support for their positions from Quebec, and thus consensus 
: 
was more Fasily achieved. 
Fif!.ally, Monahan argues that "the widespread belief among all the 
governmehts around the table that the costs ~f failure were very high" 145 was 
instrumen~al in bringing about a successful conclusion to the negotiations. 
1 43Monahan\ 228. 
144Ibid,23d 
145Ibid,236. 
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Unfortunately, this belief in the high cost of failure was not shared by the 
Canadian public. The Charlottetown Accord was put to a referendum on October 26, 
1992 and was rejected by a majority of Canadians. This study will argue that 
differing perceptions ofthe cost of failure is one of the primary reasons that Canada's 
negotiations have failed to achieve ratification whereas South Africa's negotiations 
were successful. 
APPLICATION OF THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The complexity of negotiations in general and constitutional negotiations in 
particular dictates the need for a conceptual framework through which to view the 
negotiations, particularly for the purposes of comparison. The Social-Psychological 
approach provides a useful classification of the "variables that may affect the course 
and character, of bargaining and negotiation at the interpersonal, intergroup and 
intemationallevels."146 
Dependent Variables 
Before we begin to look at the factors that affected the effectiveness of the 
negotiations in our two cases, we must establish what we mean by effectiveness. 
Rubin and Brown see criteria of bargaining effectiveness as the dependent variables in 
experiments or studies build around bargaining. The authors concede that it is 
difficult to determine bargaining effectiveness, since "bargaining frequently involves 
intangible issues as well as tangible ones ... and because agreements often have long-
term or future consequences."147 
146 Bercovitch, 129. 
147 Rubin and Brown, 33. 
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",,,,."'''''I.L, both of these our cases. The negotiations 
intkgible issues for which it is 
l 
to gage success. The 
"" .... j'''''' ........ '''.~'''''''''. paired with the relatively of time which has elapsed 
concirsion of South Africa's and the 
latest round, make it difficult to 
I success or failure, we 
South Africa's negotiation more successful, the new 
"h~l"hr,n loses legitimacy results in the widespread civil 
u.n", .. "", that the negotiated ""'l"",'.U was intended to avoid, would we 
negotiations to have been a ·"Ul.'''''''''' 
. I 
Canada may continue to peacefully under its 
constitution for several decades. In such a case, the long-term 
I 
"',",<lv'''' of the failure of the Meech ",~~.",t",·,,,... Accords be 
to be neutral. 
I 
'an attempt to identify "1J"'vU;'''' (liepfmaent variables for bargaining and 
Brown 100.Keu at most commonly used in experiments 
on He found that the two frequently selected measures of 
been "1) the number of I"r. .. r...,,,,, .. ,,,t, or COInpc;:tllLVe choices made 
the total number of trials and 2) the the outcomes obtained 
by "148 
are several difficulties in using either \.1"'1"''''''.\.1''''.'' variables for 
l 
our of the calculation of co··on!er~ltl\l'e or competitive 
IS ,",A\,,",,,,,.,uUJ;:,l difficult in a J;:,v ......... vu such as those that we 
- particularly when the available IS third-party and historicaL 
of a series of choices may not overall result of the 
148 Rubin 34. 
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.. "'J;;,VLl' .... 'V... Finally, these variables seem to on the relative success or 
to the negotiation rather than success the negotiation as a whole. 
challenge of defming success in 
However, we will attempt to set some parameters 
Firstly, we will on success of the negotiation as a 
is 
relative success or any of the parties to the negotiation. 
formidable. 
of our study. 
than on the 
we will 
look at the immediate negotiation, setting aside the 
For this study, successful COIlstltutllonal will be defined as one 
which addresses the major a constitutional amendment or a new 
sources conflict. Since for our purposes it is not long-
a constitutional term durability of 
settlement which is 
It is lTn1 ... {'\ .. t~n 
the negotiation 
negotiated settlements being 
and proclaimed will be deemed su(;ce:SSlIUI 
to note that the Social-Psychological approach on 
and not on the ratification of the results of the negotiation by 
external parties. This is Canadian case, the u .... !'~v ...... , ..... '" 
Charlottetown Accords could 
"'"""'.,,,.., which were acceptable to all 
took place leading to the "U"",,"U 
successful in that they 
to negotiation, however both ratification by 
legislatures (in 
Charlottetown). 
of success 
case Meech Lake) or case of 
purposes of this study, we must "''''1.1 .... ,' ... our definition 
.. ... ,vu to include ratification 
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Indepelt4eltt Variables 
A~ was outlined in Chapter 2 (Throretical Framework), Rubin and Brown 
have ideqtified a number of independent variables as factors affecting bargaining 
I 
effective~ess. In doing so, they concede th~t there is an inherent danger in using this 
I 
kind of "organizational scheme" to investigate something as complex as a negotiation 
"even as i~ systematically sharpens the clarity of certain issues, it removes or obscures 
I I 
: ' 
others fOliJ1l the investigator's (and the reader's) view."149 While recognizing the 
I 
danger of lObs curing some issues, the authors see the use of an organizational structure 
I I 
as a nece~sity. We view the use of the soCial-psychological framework in the same 
light. while we must be aware of its limitations, it allows us to organize issues 
I · , I 
occurring within two otherwise unwieldy cases. 
I 
In, Chapter 2, we identified the four underlying dimensions within which 
I I 
Rubin and Brown organize their independe,nt variables: a) the structural context; b) 
the beha~ioural predispositions of the parties; c) the nature and underlying 
I 
characteri~tics of the bargainers' interdepeJdence; and d) the use of social influence 
and influe~ce strategies. I 50 We will now use each of these dimensions to analyze our 
two cases.i 
structural} Factors 
Str!uctural factors relate to the physical and social characteristics of the 
negotiatioi1. Bercovitch describes these as situational factors and divides them into 
I 
sub-categories, including physical components (eg. site of bargaining), social 
I 
I 
I 
, 
149Rubin an\! Brown, 34. 
150 Ibid, 36.! 
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components (eg. number of parties involved, presence of third parties), issue 
components (eg. tangible or intangible conflict issues, number of issues) and 
components relating to interpersonal orientation (eg. communication channels, 
openness or secrecy of the process). 151 
According to the accounts of observers, the physical components of the 
negotiations played only a minor role in our two cases. Nonetheless, the symbolism 
of the negotiating sites was taken into consideration by organizers. 
In South Africa, the Codes a negotiations took place at the World Trade Center 
outside of the Johannesburg Jan Smuts Airport, a site which was chosen for its lack of 
symbolism. It was felt that these historic negotiations should take place in a venue 
"with little association to the past." 152 When the negotiati ns resumed after the 
collapse of Codesa, they were once again held at the World Trade Center. 
During the post-Codesa negotiations, the two main negotiating parties would 
periodically make use of bosberaad, private meetings at remote venues, to discuss 
critical issues. Game parks were favoured 'because they were relatively inaccessible 
to outsiders and the casual atmosphere was congenial. l53 
In Canada, both accords that were reached in the late 80's and early 90's bore 
the names of the places where they were conceived. The Meech Lake Accord was 
negotiated at a government conference centre in the Gatineau Hills near Ottawa. The 
selection of Charlottetown, where the agreement on Confederation had been signed 
over a century earlier, for the conclusion of the "Canada Round" negotiations was no 
mistake. It was meant to evoke Canada's roots and its history as a nation. What is 
ironic is that while the "Canada Round" emphasized public participation and citizen 
151 Bercovi tch, 131. 
152Friedman et ai, 1993,21. 
153 Atkinson, 24. 
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I 
engagem~nt, the Confederation 
of 1867, ~as no great feat 
constituti6n was the product 
I 
leading tOi the Meech 
Ini terms of physical 
I 
negotiations, although 
purposes, I had relatively little 
. . I I' exammmg. t IS to 
was 
negotiatink n.,rT..:." 
for any settlement {'{\tnnl1{,~lrp~ 
I 
difficult t<1> ....... 1'"> ... -
I 
secluded bosberaad to 
! 
I 
Artother important 
I , 
such as tHe number of .... <:IrT"." 
I 
I 
absolute number of ",,-,,rt,,,.,, 
relatively ~imilar. 
I federal g<jlvernment and 
64 
America Act 
Canada's 
more in common with the process 
___ .... ,.., to the Charlottetown Accord. 
'-'VJ ...... , .. u." that the locations of the 
~out for symbolic and public relations 
outcomes of the cases that we are 
that in the South African context the 
for the resolution of critical issues 
to small number of main 
whose consent is required 
as win be discussed below. It is 
gO'vennment sneaking away for a 
social components, 
parties. The 
under consideration IS 
11 were represented - including 
1 0 provinc~s. During the Charlottetown 
negotiatio*s, the 11 go'verrurlentS were joined by representatives of the two territorial 
governmemts (the 
I 
Yukon) and representatives of 
two negotiations is the of the 
only the first ministers (Premiers and the federal 
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Prime Minister) were allowed at the negotiations. During the Charlottetown Accord 
negotiations, senior ministers and advisors were included, thus greatly increasing the 
size of the delegations. 
In South Africa, 19 delegations were included at Codesa. The Kempton Park 
negotiations were more inclusive, with each of the Codes a parties being allowed to 
invite another party. 155 Although the absolute number of negotiating parties at South 
Africa's negotiations was greater, the number of parties whose consent was 
considered critical to a settlement was far smaller. As Friedman argues, 
"the negotiations were in essence a pact between the two major parties, 
the African National Congress and the National Party. Others - most 
notably the Inkatha Freedom Party and its allies - certainly played 
some role in shaping the outcome, but it was a secondary one: it 
influenced the details but not the substance of our current political 
order." 156 
Due to Canada's amending formula, the unanimous agreement of the 
negotiating parties was a requirement. This meant that all 11 of the negotiating 
parties were integral forces in the negotiations. The relative power of the negotiating 
parties in both Canada and South Africa will be discussed in more detail below during 
our consideration of interdependence factors. 
The presence of third parties is another facet of structural components to 
negotiation and bargaining. In both of our cases, third parties were not present as 
formal mediators. Due to the pervasive nature of the conflicts in both nations, 
virtually the only possibility for neutral third-party intervention would be by 
foreigners. Any South African or Canadian presiding over the negotiations would 
invariably be associated with, and accused of favouring, one of the parties. 
] 54 Mary Ellen Turpel, "The Charlottetown Discord and Aboriginal Peoples' Struggle for Fundamental 
Political Change" in The Charlottetown Accord, the Referendum and the Future of Canada, McRoberts 
and Monahan, eds. (University of Toronto Press, 1993), 117-118. 
155 Atkinson, 25. 
156Friedman et aI, 1993, xii 
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In South L ]u .• ,"""'. the IJV.,"'.Vl was discussed, and 
even deJanded by some ... " .. ,,'''<' had been attempted 
, 
in the pa~t as a means of The failure of 
I 
the Eminbnt iJP1"(!£\r,(! evidence that South 
Africa's ~~'U.H'~' could not a full ,",VA .. UlL""A"''' by the parties to 
l 
that conflict. 
movement Tnu",;,r£T a had begun, the South 
i 
i 
African qovernment insisted that with the 
ANC and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) AU"",""<,L!". that it was. l PAC 
, 
insisted tiat negotiations leading to a '"'v •• ..,,,',,. 
constitution, would have to occur a 
, 
The PAC ,bventually retreated this demand. 
I 
In~ernational mediation did enter into 
! 
until the tinal days. A team of mediators 
constitutiJn as negotiated was 
I ' 
settlement!. Landsberg argues that this coulq more 
rather thaln mediation. 159 In 
constituti~nal disputes, as the team 
I 
outcome ",as unlikely. 
In banada, third mediation has pot 
upon 
argued that the federal government has, at 
would the 
at a venue. 158 
ll"'j~Vt,l<"'lVIJl"', but not 
the 
a 
as a 
constitutio~al negotiations, attempted to act a facilitator. In the 
, 
example, t'the federal government at many points "'1-'1-'''''''' 
157Landsberg, 283. 
158 Atkinson; 18-19, 
159 Landsbet 292. 
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strategy or any sense of 'bottom-line' objectives. The main role it played was to act 
as a facilitator for the other parties around the table."160 Nonetheless, the federal 
government can not be considered to be a disinterested third party playing the role of 
mediator. Whatever the results of future rounds, the federal government will certainly 
be a full party to the negotiations. 
Another component of structural factors deals with the types and number of 
issues that are under negotiation. As has been mentioned previously, both the South 
African and Canadian negotiations have been wide-ranging and have dealt primarily 
with intangible conflict issues. These two characteristics make for exceptionally 
difficult negotiations, as there is much on the table and it is difficult to simply divide 
things up equitably. 
In our comparison of both nations, it is difficult to argue which nation was 
dealing with more issues or which negotiation dealt with more intangible issues. The 
fact is that both Canada and South Africa have contemplated their very existence as 
nations. The constitutional negotiations in each nation have dealt with the definition 
of the society, the governing institutions, the division of powers between orders of 
government, the rights and freedoms of the citizenry and the responsibilities of the 
state. 
One could argue that Canada's negotiations, SInce they have dealt with 
amendments to an existing constitution rather than the building of a constitution from 
the ground up, should have been easier than South Africa's negotiations. However, 
we would argue that the depth and breadth of the issues covered during Canada's 
negotiations have been such that the complexity of the negotiations rival any 
constitution-building exercise. 
160 Monahan" 231. 
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, . 
Thus, in terms of the number and tangibility of the issues under discussion, we 
i 
would furher argue that Canada and South! Africa have both tackled a broad range of 
intangible issues and no conclusions can he drawn from the comparison of the two 
nations on the basis of issue components. 
! 
TI~e final component of structural factors that we will examine relates to 
interpersqnal orientation such as the nature ,of communication channels, the openness 
I 
of the pr~cess and the tensions experienced by the parties. 161 We would argue that it 
is in these factors that we can begin to find the answer to the question of this study: 
I • 
why did South Africa succeed in negotiatin~ a new Constitution, whereas Canada has 
been una~le to amend its Constitution despite repeated attempts? Both of the cases 
i 
have invo~ved negotiations taking place in h;ighly charged environments and this must 
certainly ~ave had an impact on the negotiators. 
04e of the structural factors which contributed significantly to South Africa's 
; , 
success '"1as the influence of the international community. We are discussing this 
apart fr0j the sections on the role of i third parties because the international 
community acted not so much as a third party mediator (although this was desired by 
! 
some of ,he parties to the South African negotiation), hut rather as a source of 
I • 
pressure dn the South African negotiators. i The existence of violence in the South 
i 
African c~nflict and the fact that one of the parties to the conflict has been oppressed 
by the othbr throughout most of the nation's ihistory gave the international community 
compellin~ reasons to intervene. 
In Ithe case of Canada, these reasons for intervention do not exist and it is 
unlikely that the international community will interfere in the affairs of the country. 
i 
: ' 
i 
That being said, signals from influential members of the international community on 
! 
161 Bercovitc!h, 131. 
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if and how a sovereign Quebec would be recognized could impact on the national 
unity debate. Another aspect of the international community's role is that which has 
been played by the financial community in warning Canada that as long as the 
national unity question lingers it will have negative repercussions for Canada's 
economy. 
As was discussed in Chapter Four, pressure by the international community 
was an important factor in getting the parties to the negotiating table. This pressure 
and influence continued to playa role throughout the negotiations. Chris Landsberg 
argues that foreign intervention helped to create the preconditions for negotiation, 
became less influential during the initial stages of the negotiating process and then 
played an increased role when the process encountered difficulties. 162 Landsberg 
further argues that "despite protestations to the contrary, foreign influence over 
negotiations was not restricted to attempts to ensure its success, regardless of the 
substantive outcome: attempts to shape the nature of the settlement were also 
evident."163 He argues that the U.S. as well as other western nations nudged South 
Africa towards federalism both through "helpful advice" and "conscious direction".164 
The amount of influence that international actors were able to wield during 
South Africa's negotiations is arguable. However, many commentators agree that the 
attention of the international community added to the sense of urgency. 
Summary of Findings - Structural Factors 
To summarize, we found that physical components played little role in either 
negotiation, however the removal of key negotiators to remote locations for the 
resolution of critical issues was found to be useful in the South African context. In 
162 Landsberg, 284. 
163 Ibid., 287. 
164 Ibid., 288. 
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terms of l number of negotiating parties, :we found that although South Africa's 
negotiati~ns included a greater number of parties, there were fewer parties whose 
consent ~as considered critical to consedsus (ANC and NP) than in the case of 
I 
Canada, ~here the agreement of all ten provincial governments and the federal 
I d d £ I • • W ld h h government were nee e or consensus on major pomts. e wou argue t at t e 
, 
presence ~f fewer critical negotiating parties is one of the factors in South Africa's 
I success. . 
, 
THere was no direct involvement of third parties in either negotiation, except 
I ; 
for a few l failed attempts at international tnediation in South Africa. In terms of 
number of issues, we found that both parties were dealing with a comparable number 
of compldx issues. Finally, we found that the pressure brought to bear on South 
i 
Africa's n~gotiators by the scrutiny of the international community added to the sense 
I 
of urgenc) and aided in the achievement of i negotiated settlement. 
I 
Behaviou1a. Dispositions 
Th~ behavioural dispositions of the bargainers are another dimension of 
negotiatiol.. Rubin and Brown argue that "there is little doubt that personality 
variables, ls well as other individual characteristics, are important determinants of 
I 
bargaining: behaviour."165 Bercovitch refers to these as personal factors, which 
include "aU the individual characteristics, needs, attitudes, expectations and other 
enduring tSPositions which the actors bring with them."166 Although scientific 
i 
analysis of the personal characteristics of the main actors in the South African and 
I : 
Canadian qonstitutional negotiations is lacking, many pundits have suggested that in 
165 Rubin ana Brown, 37. 
166 BO<OOVi't" 130. . 
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both cases the personalities of the negotiators have had an impact on outcomes. 
It is worth noting that although the social-psychological approach focuses on 
the impact of personalities on the negotiation itself, the impact on public perceptions 
of the negotiation can not be discounted. In both the South African and Canadian 
cases the personalities of individual members of the negotiating parties had an impact 
on both the negotiations themselves and on how the public perceived the negotiations. 
Due to the importance of public perceptions of the negotiations in both cases, we will 
consider this aspect of personal factors in this study. 
J. E. Spence contends that "the elusive factor of personality needs to be taken 
into account" when studying the South African negotiations. 167 He argues that 
although a number of factors influenced the emergence and ultimate success of the 
new breed of leader that F. W. de Klerk would prove to be, the personality of de Klerk 
can not be discounted. Spence states that it was de Klerk's right wing leanings left 
him unencumbered by the ideological baggage that might have restricted another 
leader and allowed him to understand what needed to be done in difficult 
circumstances. A less pragmatic individual might have been more persistent in 
holding on to the last vestiges of apartheid. 
The personality of Nelson Mandela has also been hailed as one of the primary 
reasons that South Africa did not erupt into fun-scale civil war. Apart from his role as 
the charismatic leader of his people and his party, Mandela has been credited with 
convincing white South Africans that they would have a place within an ANC-led 
South Africa. As one author observed, "peace was made because Mandela was able 
167 Spence, p. 5. 
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to persuade Afrikaners that he had the best interests of the nation - their nation, his 
nation, th~ South African nation at heart. They learned to trust him with their fate."168 
D~vid Welsh credits Mandela and De Klerk with "ensuring that whatever 
i ; 
vicissitudes the negotiating process suffered it would not be permanently derailed."169 
He argues that these two men had a constructive, cordial relationship in the beginning 
and that they understood the grim alternatives for South Africa should a settlement 
not be reiached. The relationship would later break down, however, and it is the 
, ' 
efforts of two other men who would keep the negotiations moving along. 
R~elf Meyer, Minister of Constitutional Development and Cyril Ramaphosa, 
SecretaryrGeneral of the ANC, were the chief negotiators for their respective 
I , 
organizations. These two individuals acted as an important conduit for the two main 
negotiating parties between the collapse of Codesa in 1992 and the resumption of 
I 
i 
negotiati~ns in 1993.1 70 In those politically heated times, it was not possible for 
I 
Mandela ~nd De Klerk to engage in official·communications, however they were able 
, 
, 
to keep tre lines of communications open through Meyer and Ramaphosa, who 
became lql0wn collectively as "the channel." Throughout the negotiations, the cordial 
relationship between the two chief negotiators, built on mutual trust and respect, 
I i 
I 
played an 'important role in facilitating the process. 171 
In iCanada, the debate on the influence of personalities has centred around the 
I 
i 
issue of Prme Minister Brian Mulroney's unpopularity with the electorate. Mulroney 
was PriJe Minister during the negotiation of both the Meech Lake and the 
Charlottetown Accords. One of the findings of the Spicer Commission, which 
168 Patti W~ldmeir, Anatomy of a Miracle: the End of Apartheid and the Birth of the New South 
Africa (Ne~ York: WW. Norton and Company, 1997.,92. 
[69 Welsh, 23-24 
170 Welsh, 24. 
171 Ibid. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Chapter 5 - Comparative Analysis 73 
travelled throughout Canada to consult with the public and ensure that their concerns 
were reflected in any future constitutional proposals, was that many Canadians had 
negative attitudes towards Prime Minister Mulroney. In polling done after the defeat 
of the Charlottetown Accord, 10% of respondents indicated that they voted "No" out 
of opposition to Brian Mulroney. 172 Nonetheless, the dissatisfaction with politicians 
certainly extended beyond one individual politician and it would be difficult to make 
the case that the defeat of the Accord was due to dissatisfaction with the Prime 
Minister. It is doubtful that any individual as Prime Minister, given the same set of 
circumstances, could have brokered a significantly different package of amendments 
or convinced the Canadian public to accept them. 
Another influential personality in the 1992 Referendum campaign is former 
Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau. Trudeau, who was a charismatic figure during his 15 
years as Prime Minister,173 and who presided over the 1982 repatriation of the 
Constitution, made a dramatic intervention during the Referendum campaign that 
many credit with collapsing the "Yes" vote outside of Quebec. Pierre Trudeau, a 
Quebecer, is seen by many in his province as a traitor for his role in repatriating the 
constitution without Quebec's consent and for his insistence on a model of federalism 
that gives equal status to an of the provinces. He is, however, widely respected 
outside of Canada and is seen as "a credible interpreter of Quebec politics to voters 
outside that province." 174 Trudeau first voiced his opposition to the Charlottetown 
Accord on October 1st. Over the next two days, the "Yes" vote collapsed in the 
opinion polls. 
I 72 "Why Canadians Voted the Way They Did" (Maclean'slDecima Poll), Maclean's, 2 Nov. 1992, 17. 
As cited in Monahan, "The Sounds of Silence ", 238. 
173 Canadian Parliamentary Library, Can~dian Prime Ministers Since 1867, 
www.par1.gc.ca/36/refmat/library/pm-e.htm 
174Johnston, Richard. "An Inverted Logroll: The Charlottetown Accord and the Referendum." P.S. 
Political Science & Politics. March 1993.47. 
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pJter Russell has described mega-constitutional politics, such as that in which 
both Cankda and South Africa have been engaged, as "exceptionally emotional and 
intense." 1175 In this atmosphere, it is not sJrprising that the personalities of particular 
individuals can make a difference, both at the negotiating table and in the battle for 
I 
public suJport. What is difficult to gage is Ithe importance of personalities relative to 
other fac~brs in the negotiating process. It is also difficult to know whether the 
I 
actions of individuals are influenced primarily by the situations in which they find 
, 
themselvels or by inherent personal characteristics. 
Tlo other aspects of individual cha~acteristics about which Rubin and Brown 
i 
have drawn conclusions are race and nationality. The authors found that "subjects 
tend to batgain more co-operatively with ani opponent of the same race than with one 
of anothe~ race."176 In terms of nationality, Rubin and Brown found that there were 
too few sthdies upon which to base a general conclusion, however they cited a study 
which fo~nd that in a study involving French Canadians and English Canadians, 
"weaknesJ in another of shared cultural background acts to minimize exploitative 
I I 
behaviour.i The same weakness in another of from a different, and presumably 
disliked, b~ckground, seems to invite exploitation. I77 
i : 
In the case of South Africa, the fact that the two main negotiating parties were 
I 
of differe* races in a society that has large~y been defined by race" would certainly 
have added to the difficulty in achieving co-operative behaviour. As we will see in 
I 
I 
our exami~ation of interactional factors and: social influence strategies, however, the 
confrontadonal behaviour initially displayed by the negotiating parties faded into co-
I 
operative ~ehaviour later in the negotiations, We would suggest that race is a strong 
! 
175Russell, 1~93(2), 33. 
176 Rubin an~ Brown, 163. 
177 Swindle,' 1970, as cited in Rubin and Brown, 165, 
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factor in inhibiting co-operative behaviour before the negotiating parties become 
acquainted, however as the parties begin to relate as individuals rather than as 
members of an opposing race, race becomes less of a factor. 
In the Canadian case, it is difficult to detennine the influence of the fact that 
French Canadians and English Canadians were involved in the negotiation, because 
once the negotiations began they were not on strictly opposing sides. As we will see 
when we discuss interactional factors, French Canadians were often allied with 
English Canadians on various issues. The presence of aboriginal Canadians during 
the Charlottetown Accord adds another nationality group. We would argue that while 
nationality may have played a significant role in how members of the public 
perceived the conflict and the proposed settlement, it was not a detennining factor 
among the negotiators themselves. 
Summary of Findings - Behavioural Dispositions 
To summarize, we found that in the South African case, many observers have 
pointed to the role of leaders such as Nelson Mandela and F.W. de Klerk as well as 
negotiators such as Cyril Ramaphosa and Roelf Meyer as key detenninants of the 
success of the negotiated settlement. It is arguable whether individuals with different 
behavioural dispositions facing similar circumstances would have achieved similar 
results. It is important to note that beyond the negotiation itself, the behavioural 
dispositions of these individuals played a significant part in maintaining public 
confidence in the process. 
In the case of the Canadian negotiations, more has been written on the role of 
personalities in the court of public opinion than in the negotiations themselves. A 
fonner Canadian provincial premier observes that few observers understand the 
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chemistry between the several 
unpopular personality of 
Meech Lake and Charlottetown 
would that the personalities of individuals the umque 
interperso1nal relationships that they forge can and does have a on 
....... v"". however it is rarely the aet.ernrnnmg other 
even the most skilled negotiator and p<;If1!prc can 
In a similar vein, Michael Stein "in 
situations, t~e actual 
of actors are less 
that they assume." 179 
from both the South African and the ,--,a'.AaY .. ' .. 
the same set of actors who had failed to 
sm;celeoe:a in achieving a negotiated settlement at 
The ,",u" ... u,,,,,,, the same, h wever other circumstances had vB,.Uav\,.l. 
'-''''''".......... the positions of the negotiating in numerous 
constitutional 
I 
vu',U'F,VY radically despite changes to the rosters 
negotiatorS. 
I 
incumbents ofthe same political 
may bargalnlIllg positions despite gretlt 
their ba(;k2rOlmd to of their party labels 
" in Kenneth McRoberts and Patrick Monahan, eds. 
lJ1!illllilQ!:!!~Ml.M.:.~;UjtliUillJ~l!l!!!!L!!!lli!.1I1!;...t.Y1YIJ~..QI!.!li!l!. (Uni versity of Toronto Press: 
Toronto, 1993), 174. 
179Stein, 5. ! 
180Ibid. I 
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The influence of race and nationality in both cases may have been a 
complicating factor at the beginning of both negotiations, but we have argued that it 
became less of a factor as the negotiations progressed in South Africa and that it was 
not a determining factor in the case of Canada. 
Interdependence Factors 
The third dimension of factors affecting negotiating and bargaining is the 
interdependence of bargainers. This involves the relationship between parties (were 
they acquainted prior to the start of the negotiations, what is the relationship of power 
and dependency, do the parties expect to have future contact with each other?)181 
In terms of interdependence factors, it would seem that South Africa was in a 
much more difficult situation than Canada. Firstly, the motivation of the negotiating 
parties was highly disparate and their attitudes towards each other extremely negative. 
Observers of the South African negotiations have observed that "the ANC and the NP 
government approached each other from profoundly different positions." 182 While 
the ANC was negotiating the transfer of power, the NP believed that it was 
negotiating some form of power-sharing. These opposing motivations made 
negotiations extremely difficult. Before the negotiations could produce agreements of 
substance, there had to be agreement on what the negotiations would be about. 
It is intuitive that after several decades of violent conflict, the attitudes of the 
negotiating parties in South Africa would initially be marked by suspicion and 
tension. Although the hostility between the negotiating parties faded to cordial 
relations with surprising speed, the tension would re-emerge periodically throughout 
18] Rubin and Brown, 38. 
1 82Welsh, 23. 
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the negotJations. 
I 
Fqr example, although De Klerk and Mandela had forged a good working 
relationshIp through early negotiations, at the opening of Codesa the two men had 
I I 
terse words for each other. De Klerk, whd was scheduled as the last speaker of the 
plenary session, slipped into his speech an accusation that the ANC had failed to 
I 
honour it~ commitment to dismantle its guerrila forces. He then questioned the 
! . 
ANC's ability to enter into binding agreements. Mandela was furious and rose for an 
I 
I 
impromptu speech in which he described De Klerk as "the head of an illegitimate, 
discreditek, minority regime" and accused him of breaking confidence and of being 
"less than frank." 183 This was merely a public indication of a relationship that had 
been dete*orating for months. The loss of ~rust between the leaders of the ANC and 
the ]W was a rift that would make negotiations more difficult. Fortunately this was 
! 
mitigated by the establishment of good relations between the chief negotiators of each 
I i 
party and :the members of delegations in working groups and technical committees. 
The trust ~hat had deteriorated between the leading figures would be rebuilt by the 
I lower ranliis. 184 
I 
In Canada, the motivations of the negotiating parties have not always been in 
I 
perfect swchronization, however they have been closer than in South Africa. For 
I · 
example, during the Quebec Round negotiations leading to the Meec;h Lake Accord, 
there was Igeneral agreement among the parties that the purpose of the negotiations 
was to acbieve Quebec's consent to the 1982 constitution by dealing with five 
i : 
conditions i advanced by the provincial government. During the Canada round, the 
I 
parties 1mi that they were negotiating a Rackage of constitutional amendments to 
1 83Mandela, las cited in Allister Sparks, Tommorrow is Another Country: The Inside Story of South 
Africa's Roatl to Change. (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1996) 
184 Ibid. I 
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deal with Quebec's demands as well as the concerns of Aboriginal peoples and the 
Western provinces. 
As for the attitudes of the parties towards each other, in Canada they have 
traditionally been quite cordial. Whether this will continue is another matter. If 
constitutional negotiations do resume in Canada, they may be far more acrimonious 
than in the past. 
It appears at first glance that the distribution of power between the negotiating 
parties was more unequal than in Canada. The fact that one of the parties (the South 
African GovernmentlNational Party) could martial the resources of the state and the 
other was a revolutionary party that had been in exile for the previous decade signals 
a large power differential. However, if we look beyond access to resources and the 
power associated with governance, it becomes apparent that the ANC was quite 
powerful in its own right. 
Marina Ottoway argues that "the National Party's strength was institutional 
control, the ANC's popular support and the Inkatha's ethnic nationalism." 185 She 
argues that besides control over the government and the security forces, the NP had 
very few assets due to a small, and steadily decreasing, degree of popular support. 
The NP's key asset during the negotiations was the fact that "only the NP could keep 
the institutions, and above all the security forces, under control during the 
transition." 186 
Ottoway argues that the ANC's assets were In its popular support and its 
ability to bring pressure on the government through mass action such as general 
strikes.1 87 We would argue that another asset of the ANC was the control of its own 
1850ttoway, 159. 
186Ibid, 162. 
I 87Ibid, 163. 
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guerilla aPnY, the Umkhonto we Sizwe, which was vital during the struggle and 
which alllwed the ANC to maintain an unspoken threat of violence to counter the 
South Afrkan Government's military forces .. 
i 
In 'Canada, some of the negotiating parties have had relatively similar bases of 
power. Tpe federal government and the teI1 provincial governments all have popular 
support btthind them. The province of Quebec brings an added element in that it can 
I 
i 
make a threat of succession that is backed up by a significant, though fluctuating, 
, 
degree of Is up port. Larger provinces, such ~s Ontario, British Columbia and Alberta 
have more power than smaller provinces, such as New Brunswick and Prince Edward 
, 
Island. Tfuey have both more financial resources to devote to negotiations and larger 
i 
populatiorl bases. The federal government is naturally prone to pay more attention to 
i 
the concerhs of provinces in which it can hope to win more votes in the next election. 
Th~ parties to the Canada's negotiations that are the least powerful are the 
aboriginal I organizations. They have more power than some organizations in Canada 
as evidended by their very presence at the Aegotiating table, however they are weak 
compared ~o the other parties. The aboriginal organizations represent much smaller 
constituenCies than most of the eleven governments and their electoral legitimacy is 
not as cle~r-cut. These organizations do not have access to the same financial 
resources as the governments at the table, nor do they control substantial security 
forces. TJe weakness of the aboriginal organizations relative to the other negotiating 
I 
parties is ~videnced by the fact that they can be included or excluded at the whim of 
the other parties. 
, 
parties. 
i 
An<:>ther aspect of interactional factors is the relationship of the negotiating 
Marina Ottoway argues that in the case of South Africa, the failure of 
i 
negotiating blocs to develop between each of the two primary negotiating parties and 
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smaller parties complicated the negotiations. She contends that "the existence of two 
cohesive blocs could create an atmosphere of confrontation, encouraging both sides to 
intransigence, while independent organizations could facilitate an agreement by acting 
as mediators" rather than an atmosphere where many small parties had to be heard 
under the rules of Codesa and slowed down the process "while failing to provide a 
bridge or suggest compromises." 188 
In the Canadian case, alliances developed between various provinces around 
certain issues. For example, on Senate reform, the provinces were divided into those 
who supported a "Triple-E" model (elected, effective, equal representation from all 
provinces), a group which included Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Nova Scotia 
and Newfoundland, and those provinces that were opponents of the model, namely 
Ontario and Quebec. 189 On another issue - aboriginal self-government - a quite 
different set of alliances formed, with Ontario, British Columbia, Saskatchewan, 
Prince Edward Island and New Brunswick supporting the "inherent right" of 
aboriginal peoples to self government, while a second group composed of Alberta, 
Manitoba, Quebec, and Newfoundland was sceptical of constitutionally entrenching 
this right. 19o What is important to note is that no clear "negotiating blocs" developed. 
Instead, different alliances formed around different issues. It is particularly 
interesting to note that although both negotiations were initially seen as means to 
bringing Quebec into the constitution, the negotiating dynamic was not Quebec 
against the rest of the country. Instead, Quebec formed parts of alliances with other 
. ., provmces on vanous Issues. 
1880ttoway, 165. 
189 Monahan, 234. 
190 Ibid, 234. 
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The most significant success factor in the South African case in terms of the 
inter-relafonshiP of the negotiating parties involves the perception of the conflict and 
the "need: to move together towards some acceptable outcome.,,191 One of the main 
factors in: South Africa's relatively peaceful settlement was the belief among both 
major ne~otiating partners that there was no alternative to reaching a negotiated 
settlemenf. David Welsh argues that the antagonists in South Africa's conflict 
mutually :recognized that they had reach a stalemate and that the conflict could only 
I 
be conti~ued at an "appalling cost in terms of bloodshed and destruction of the 
I 
economY'I~' He adds that both sides realized that the alternative to negotiating was 
civil war. This realization both brought: the parties to the negotiating table and 
I 
prevented: derailment of the process despite setbacks along the way. 
St~ven Friedman notes that the major negotiating partners' "joint commitment 
i 
to negotiated constitutional change stemmed from the joint realisation that that the 
I I 
very different visions which had informed most of their political lives were 
unattainaOle." 192 What Friedman finds remarkable is that both De Klerk and 
I 
I 
Mandela !concluded separately that compromise was unavoidable. Even more 
remarkabje is the fact that both leaders were able to garner the support of their parties 
for the significant compromises that would be required. 
! 
Fziedman traces some of the primary factors that led both parties to the 
conclusio~ that compromise was inevitable. For the ANC, he points out that the 
i 
guerrilla Jar never held a serious prospect df overthrowing the apartheid state and the 
! 
physical ~nd economic cost of housing ANC bases was becoming unsustainable for 
i 
neighbourfng states. Changes taking place in the Soviet Union, which was unwilling 
to continup funding military activity also weakened the ANC's prospects of achieving 
I 
I 
191Friedmad,1994. 
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a revolutionary victory. Also, the economic sanctions that were being undertaken by 
a number of powerful members of the international community at the ANC's urging 
were not proving to be an effective revolutionary instrument. 
The NP also became convinced that the costs of ruling by force were 
unsustainable in the long tenn. The economic decline due to sanctions and military 
costs was taking its toll. Finally, the erosion of soviet power along with the increased 
respectability of South Africa created by its role in negotiating for Namibian 
independence lowered the risks of negotiation. Essentially, the costs of not 
negotiating were steadily increasing, whereas the rewards of negotiating were also on 
the rise. 193 
In Canada, the costs of not reaching an agreement have been much lower. 
There was no real concern during the negotiation of or the public debate around either 
the Meech Lake or the Charlottetown Accords that the nation would erupt into 
violence if an agreement was not reached. Although there have been isolated 
instances of rioting associated with Quebec nationalism, one high profile terrorist 
incident by the Front de Liberation de Quebec (FLQ) in the 1970's, and some violent 
clashes between security forces and aboriginal protesters, the Canadian conflict has 
been remarkably peaceful. 
The perceived cost of not reaching an agreement during the Canada Round of 
negotiations was the separation of the province of Quebec to fonn a sovereign state. 
After the collapse of the Meech Lake Accord, Premier Robert Bourassa had 
committed his province to a vote on sovereignty by October 26th, 1992 if a new 
constitutional proposal addressing Quebec's concerns was not forthcoming. The 
1 92Friedman et aI, 1994, p. 9. 
I 93Friedman et ai, 1993, p: 10-13. 
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negotiatiI1g partners were aware that if such 'a vote was held, the result could very well 
lead to th~ disintegration of Canada. 
Although the perceived cost of not reaching agreement was not as high for 
Canada's hegotiators as for those in South Africa, Canada's political leaders took the 
! 
threat of' Quebec's separation very seriously. The seriousness with which they 
I 
approached the negotiations is evidenced in some of the remarkable compromises that 
I 
were achieved - particularly in the areas of Senate reform and aboriginal self-
governmlt. 
I 
Summary of Findings -Interdependence Factors 
In 'this study, we have found that interdependence factors in both Canada and 
South A~ca largely favoured a successful' negotiation. Rubin and Brown suggest 
that equal: power among bargainers tends to result in more effective bargaining that 
i 
unequal Jower. 194 We found that although it would appear that the National 
I 
I 
Party/South African Government had greater power than the ANC, the ANC was able 
I ' 
to marshal the power of public support and the threat that violence could erupt in the 
townShiPs
l 
if the ANC were to lose public confidence. In the case of Canada, we 
found tha~ the power wielded by the individual provinces was comparable, although 
I 
more popillated provinces are more powerful than small provinces. The Canadian I , 
I 
federal go~ernment had greater power at its disposal, however in both negotiations the 
federal goi:vernment generally used this power to attempt to bring about a resolution 
rather thrui to gain concessions for its own purposes.1 95 
In lerms of alliances, we found that cphesive negotiating blocs did not develop 
I I 
in either of the two cases. In South Africa, although the National Party and the ANC 
194 Rubin Brown, 199. 
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were the primary negotiating parties, they did not succeed in building cohesive 
alliances with the smaller parties. In Canada, alliances varied from issue to issue. 
The lack of cohesive alliances may have complicated both negotiations, however it 
may have also mitigated the confrontational tendencies that can develop with two 
opposing negotiating blocs. 
We found that the most significant interdependence factor in both negotiations 
was the commitment of the parties to finding a resolution. In South Africa, this 
commitment was strong and it kept the negotiating parties at the table through 
difficult times. In Canada, although the Canadian public was not convinced of the 
necessity of reaching a settlement, the negotiators themselves were highly motivated 
and this resulted in some surprising compromises, particularly during the 
Charlottetown Accord. 196 Rubin and Brown conclude that "a co-operative 
motivational orientation tends to lead to a more effective bargaining than an 
individualistic, and especially a competitive motivational orientation."197 We would 
argue that the negotiators in both South Africa and Canada were strongly motivated to 
achieve a settlement. We will next turn to an examination of whether this positive 
motivation translated into co-operative or competitive strategies. 
Social Influence and Influence Strategies 
The fourth dimension of independent variables within the social-psychological 
model of negotiation in bargaining is the use of social influence and influence 
strategies within the negotiation process. Rubin and Brown argue that bargainers are 
195 Monahan, 231. 
196 Lougheed, 174-175. 
197 Rubin and Brown, 199. 
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I 
influence~ by infonnation that they obtain about the other bargaining parties and exert 
influence I through the infonnation that they disclose. "It is this exchange of 
infonnati6n, the attributions to which it leads, and the ways in which it is shaped for 
I • 
the purposes of mutual social influence, that represents the fundamental strategic issue 
! 
I 
in bargain'ing. "198 
. I 
Rl.1bin and Brown suggest that influence strategies should be examined 
accordingl to three dimensions: opening moves and gestures, the overall patterning of 
moves an~ countennoves and the use of accompanying appeals and demands. 199 
I 
I 
T~e analysis of all of the influence strategies employed by the bargaining 
parties in the various rounds of constitutional negotiations in which South Africa and 
Canada engaged would be a mammoth undertaking. For the purposes of this study, 
I 
we will f~cus on the question of to what extent the general tone of the strategies and 
negotiatink positions assumed by the parties shaped the success or failure of the 
I 
•• I 
negotlatlOl1s. 
In lenns of opening moves and gestures, the South African negotiations had a 
i 
shaky start. Marina Ottoway blames the breakdown of Codesa on her contention that 
it "was build on the shaky foundations of ~onflicting goals, misunderstandings and 
, 
lack of gold faith. ,,200 She argues that the ANC entered the process with the goal of 
! I 
translating: its popular support into control over the nation's governing institutions, 
! 
whereas t,e NP sought to negotiate a power-sharing constitution that would both 
extend political rights to the black population and provide "ironclad guarantees 
I 
against wh~tes having to accept the authority of other ethnic groups.,,20l Not only did 
I 
the goals 0if the parties conflict on a fundamental level, but both sides were exhibiting 
I 
198 Rubin and Brown, 260. 
199 Ibid., 28S. 
2000ttoway, !158. 
I 
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competitive behaviour. Rubin and Brown conclude that "the early initiation of co-
operative behaviour tends to promote the development of trust and a mutually 
beneficial, co-operative relationship; early competitive behaviour, on the other hand, 
tends to induce mutual suspicion and competition."202 
By contrast, the negotiations leading to Canada's Meech Lake Accord opened 
with a relatively co-operative tone. As noted above, the five demands outlined by 
Quebec's Intergovernmental Affairs Minister in May 1986 seemed to academics and 
politicians from outside of Quebec to be "a reasonable basis for beginning another 
round of constitutional discussions."203 The counteroffer from the Rest of Canada 
was developed based on the five demands and was considered generally acceptable by 
the Quebec government. 204 The problem was that this agreement, reached through the 
elite accommodation model so common in Canadian politics, was out of step with the 
thinking of the general populous in terms of both the content of the Accord and the 
secretiveness with which it was negotiated. The co-operative strategy employed by 
both sides allowed them to achieve and agreement, however the negotiators had not 
succeeded in building trust with the citizens whom they represented, and thus the 
Accord was doomed. 
The Charlottetown Accord - which we would suggest can be seen as a 
continuation of the constitutional negotiations that produced the Meech Lake Accord 
- opened on less congenial terms. After the failure of the Meech Lake Accord, 
Quebec's Premier, Robert Bourassa, "raised the ante" by announcing that he would 
get together with Jacques Parizeau, the separatist leader of the Parti Quebecois to 
consult the Quebec people on a full range of constitutional options, including 
20Jlbid. 
202 Rubin and Brown, 263. 
203 Russell, 1993(1) 134. 
204 Ibid, 138. 
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separatioJ from Canada.205 Canadians outside of Quebec did not appreciate this new 
I 
stance. ~o quote one observer "people do not take kindly to negotiating with a knife 
to their ttoat."206 Paired with the contin1.}ing resentment in Quebec at the rejection 
I 
of the MFech Lake Accord by English Canada207, the atmosphere going into the 
Charlottetown negotiations was negatively charged. 
. I : 
D~spite deep cleavages in public sentiment between Quebec and the rest of 
Canada, the negotiators themselves behaved co-operatively in order to achieve a 
I 
unanimou~ agreement. As one former pr~vincial Premier observed, the provincial 
, 
negotiato~s realized the consequences of failure to reach an agreement and were under 
j 
pressure £tom the federal government to achieve results. "They had the intensity that 
was requi~ed to make a deal. .. and it worked in a unanimous way."208 
Summary1o/ Findings - Social Influence Strategies 
I 
RJbin and Brown concede that while social influence in bargaining is often 
I 
exerted s~{stematically and self-consciously, the outcomes of bargaining are also 
shaped in less clear-cut and rational ways. "Unwitting glances, mannerisms and 
gestures, Jrivate fears and fetishes, may be as instrumental in influencing the other as 
a bargaine~'s best-laid, most shrewdly considered strategic plan."209 
Ob!servers of both the South African and Canadian constitutional negotiations 
have emp~)asized the complexity of the negotiations and the non-linear fashion by 
: 
which neg~tiation proceeds. The influence strategies used varied from round to round 
and from (orum to forum (ie. in working groups versus plenary sessions). 
I 
205 Ibid, 1551. 
206 Leon Dion, as quoted in Russell, 1993(1), 155. 
207 McRoberts, 1997, 207. 
208 Peter Lo*gheed, "A Canadian Compromise" in The Charlottetown Accord, the Referendum and the 
Future of Canada, McRoberts & Monahan, eds. (University of Toronto Press, 1993)., 173-75. 
209 Ibid. i 
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In both cases, negotiators achieved the greatest success when all parties were 
behaving co-operatively in pursuit of the common goal of achieving a settlement. 
When competitive behaviour was exhibited, negotiations tended to come grinding to a 
halt. Fortunately, in both cases pressure to achieve a settlement resulted in generally 
co-operative strategies on the part of the negotiators, despite the disparate goals that 
the parties may have had entering into the negotiations. 
Discussion of Findings 
Having examined at the historical backgrounds of South Africa and Canada 
and having applied the social-psychological model to the constitutional negotiations 
in both countries, we must now attempt to answer the central question set out at the 
beginning of this study: 
Why did South Africa succeed in negotiating a new 
Constitution whereas Canada has been unable to amend 
its Constitution despite repeated attempts? 
The application of the social-psychological framework yielded some 
conclusions that will be useful in answering this question. In terms of the 
negotiations themselves, we found that South Africa had a number of things working 
in their favour. 
South Africa was advantaged in terms of having fewer critical negotiating 
parties. Particularly with the introduction of the ':sufficient consensus" rule at 
Codes a, negotiations were able to proceed with the agreement of the ANC and the 
National Party/South African government. In Canada's case, due to both political 
necessity and its constitutional amending formulae, the unanimous consent of ten 
provinces and the federal government was required on the full deal. - The consent of 
the major organizations representing aboriginal peoples was also required for some 
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key ele~ents of the Charlottetown Accord. The presence of few~r critical parties 
allowed hegotiators to conduct private negotiations in remote areas to resolve key 
I 
issues - a; practice which would be exceedingly difficult in the Canadian context. 
Atso working in South Africa's favour was the pressure brought to bear on 
negotiators by the international community. Although there was no successful third-
party mediation of the South African conflict, the knowledge that the world was 
watching I and that there would be severe economic repercussions if a deal was not 
, 
, 
I 
reached, served to keep the NP/SAG at the negotiating table. 
I 
I " 
Mother advantage enjoyed by South Africa was the involvement of 
charismat~c political leaders and negotiators who were committed to reaching a 
settlement. Beyond the role that these leaqers played in reaching a deal, they were 
also able to maintain the confidence of their constituencies, and thus to "sell the deal" 
I 
I 
I 
once it ha~ been struck. By contrast, the most memorable political leaders during the 
Canadian '. negotiations were those who scuttled the deal, either by speaking out 
against it! (fonner Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, for example) or by being so 
I 
enormously unpopular that their support for the Accords actually gave Canadians a 
reason no~ to support them (namely, then Prime Minister Brian Mulroney). 
w~ will argue that, when compared with Canada, the single greatest advantage 
that Southl Africa had during its negotiation was the commitment of the parties - both 
the leade~s and the general public - to a:chieving a negotiated settlement. This 
commitment led to the use of generally co-operative social influence strategies on the 
I 
part ofthe' negotiators and ensured public support for the deal once it was reached. 
I 
In :Canada, the absence of this belief in the unacceptable cost of continuing 
conflict hcis manifested itself in a number of ways, which we will discuss in more 
detail beloiw. 
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Popular Support 
The most significant reason that Canada has failed to reach a constitutional 
settlement is a failure of the governments and political elites negotiating the 
settlements to win popular support. Although elites have succeeded in reaching two 
pacts that they believed would put an end to the conflict, the Canadian populous 
ultimately rejected both pacts. 
The process that produced the Meech-Lake Accord was widely criticized in 
Canada for being exclusionary, since no public consultation took place and special 
interest groups were not included as negotiating parties. The Meech Lake Accord was 
negotiated by teams representing the ten provinces and the federal government and 
was then presented to the Canadian public in its final form. Provincial legislatures 
were required to ratify the Accord within a three-year time limit set by the existing 
Constitution, however no modifications to the Accord were to be considered. 
Although this approach to Constitution-making did not sit well with the 
Canadian public in 1987, it is precisely the way that Confederation was negotiated in 
1867 and essentially the manner in which amendments to the Constitution had been 
discussed ever since. The Confederation agreement of 1867 has been described as "a 
deal cut between politicians without public consultation and contrary to the wishes of 
a large part of the population ... 210 One would think that this recipe for constitution-
making would not bode well for the future of a nation, however Canada survived with 
very few modifications to the 1867 Constitution for over a century. 
Canadians have never been as enamoured with the concept of popular 
sovereignty and participatory democracy as Americans have been. As Stephen 
Brooks argues, "the dominant political tradition has preferred parliamentary 
210Brooks,286. 
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suprema+, responsible government and statism to fonns of governance that allow for 
direct derrocracy.,,211 However, Brooks also acknowledges a subordinate tradition, 
I ' 
particula~~y in the Western Canadian provinces, that has been suspicious of 
represent*tive government and the British parliamentary system. 
Alan Cairns argues that it was the adoption of the Charter of Rights and 
I 
Freedoms: in 1982 that created the expectation that the public will be accorded a major 
I 
role in any significant constitutional change. He contends that the movement from a 
I 
I 
governme~ts' constitution to a citizens' constitution occurred because the Charter 
I ' 
encouraged citizens to think of themselves as constitutional actors while at the same 
I 
time redu6ing the relative status of governm~nts.212 
St~phen Brooks argues that Cairns was only partially correct. He contends 
I 
that while;the Charter did have an impact in the expectations of Canadians with regard 
I 
to constitution-making, the effect was to give some of the power from governments 
I 
Canada's and polit~cal elites not to citizens, but to special interest groups. 
constitutiqn-making model has evolved from executive federalism, which entailed 
intergoverPmental negotiation by the governing elites to a system of polyarchy, which 
! 
includes cbntrolled consultation and negotiation with special interest groups. Brooks 
I 
argues that the Charter has encouraged special interest groups to emerge and 
I 
strengthen:, around the rights set out in the charter. This includes groups organized to 
I 
I 
I 
speak on behalf of women, the disabled, aboriginal Canadians and ethnic, racial and 
! : 
linguistic irinorities.213 
211 Ibid, 286l , 
212Alan Cairns, "Citizens (Outsiders) and Governments (Insiders) in Constitution-Making: The Case of 
Meech Lake'i' in Cairns, Disruptions: Constitutional Struggles, from the Charter to Meech Lake 
(Toronto: MeClelland and Steward, 1991), 109. 
I 213Brooks,2pl-93. 
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Brooks makes the argument that the Meech Lake Accord was killed by special 
interest groups, who objected to both the process that led to the agreement and the 
contents of the agreement itself. The process leading to the Charlottetown Accord of 
1992 was specifically designed to address these concerns. Two years of negotiation 
and consultation preceded the agreement and special interest groups played an 
important role in the process.2l4 Brooks argues that this process of consultation 
represented a polyarchical style of constitution-making rather than a style consistent 
with true participatory democracy. Public consent was mediated by heads of 
government plus certain citizens' interest groups in the case of the Charlottetown 
Accord. It was only in the 1992 referendum that "the public was give  a direct role in 
the constitutional amendment process. ,,215 
If the Meech Lake Accord foundered due to a gap between what the 
governments and political elites felt was an appropriate compromise and what the 
Canadian populous was willing to support, then the failure of the Charlottetown 
Accord demonstrates that a gap also existed between the perspective of special 
interest groups and the public will. 
In light of the theories advanced by Cairns and Brooks, it will be interesting to 
see whether South Africa, whose Bill of Rights bears many similarities to Canada's 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, creates an expectation among the South African 
populous that they will playa direct role in any future constitutional change. 
While it is important to encourage the development of civil society to ensure 
the consolidation of South Africa's new democracy, the growth of citizens' interest 
groups may complicate any future attempts to amend the constitution. South Africa's 
current amending formula requires the support of75% of the members ofthe National 
214Ibid,293. 
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Assembly and six provinces in the National Council of Provinces in order to amend 
the Bill of Rights, provisions affecting the provinces or the National Council of 
Provinces,: and Section 1, which stipulates that "South Africa is one, sovereign, 
democrati~ state" founded on the values of human dignity, non-racialism and non-
94 
sexism, supremacy of the constitution and supremacy of the law, and the guarantee of 
. i 
, 
certain ele~toral principals. 216 Any other provisions of the Constitution can be 
! 
amended tiy a 2/3 vote ofthe National Assembly. 
i 
, 
This amending formula is less stringent than the amending formulae of many 
I 
I 
other nations, including Canada, the United States, Germany, India and Malawi.2 17 
I 
With the ANC currently holding a greater than 2/3 majority (266 of 400 seats -
66.5%)218 ~n the National Assembly, many changes to the Constitution could be 
achieved +th the support of just one political party. That being said, the ANC must 
ensure tha~ it does not make any unpopular changes that would jeopardize its political 
legitimacyl As the South African electorate becomes more politically engaged and if 
I 
I 
they develbp an expectation, as has the Canadian populous, that they will be directly 
I 
involved iIi any attempt to amend the constitution, the South African government may 
I 
I 
find it incr~asingly difficult to advance majo:r constitutional reforms. 
i 
, 
A parallel can be drawn to South Africa's constitutional negotiations, which 
proceeded :according to a model of elite accommodation. Despite the fact that South 
I . 
Africa's negotiations were undertaken by elites with no formal public consultation, the 
I 
need to ma;intain public confidence in the negotiations remained a concern for the 
negotiator~. To give one example, the negotiators were concerned about the impact of 
215Ibid 293 I 
, '1 
216 South A~rican Constitution. (South Africa, s. 74(1)) 
217 Kory McDonald, "The Amending Formulae of Six Countries: A Comparative Perspective." 
Unpublishedl paper submitted to Professors Christina Murray and Richard Simeon, 1997. 
218 Current State of Parties in the National Assembly, Sept. 4, 1999. 
http://www.polity.org.zalgovdocs/parliamentiindex.htrnl 
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mounting violence on public confidence in the negotiations. As Mark Shaw states, 
"violence became a negotiating issue as the parties sought to show that they cared 
95 
about it and could prevent it.,,219 Hopefully as the new South African state matures 
and South Africa's democracy is consolidated, the threat of violence will be replaced 
in the minds of policy-makers with the threat ofloss of political support (and loss of 
votes). If South Africans become politically engaged in the realm of constitutional 
politics, those wishing to amend the constitution may find that they are constrained 
not just by the legal amending formula set out in the constitution, but also by public 
expectations around the level of consultation, and possibly ratification. 
Ratification Process 
On of the most problematic aspects of the Canadian case was the judgement of 
negotiators as to the needs and expectations of the groups that they represent. Both 
the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Acc rds represent a discord between what the 
negotiators thought would be acceptable to their constituencies and what their 
constituents were actually willing to accept. As Richard Johnston argues, the 
negotiators thought that "they had finally found an equilibrium, a logroll sufficiently 
inclusive to survive referral to the people .. .they may have overestimated both how 
much each group wanted what it got and how intensely some groups opposed key 
concessions to others. ,,220 
Since the South African constitutional settlement was not subject to 
ratification through a national referendum, the negotiators were not faced with the 
necessity of convincing their constituencies to accept all of the provisions of the 
219Mark Shaw, "The Bloody Backdrop" in The Small Miracle, 182. 
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I 
negotiated: settlement. Nonetheless, due to the possibility of civil unrest, violence or 
I 
mass emi~ation, the negotiators were compelled to ensure that the main elements of 
the settlenlent would be acceptable to most segments of the population. 
W l would argue that in South Africa, the populous was satisfied with a 
negotiatedl settlement that they believed was far better than the alternative of 
continuin~ uncertainty and unrest. South Africans were. willing to let their leaders 
i 
negotiate * settlement that may be flawed and may hold disadvantages for one group 
I 
or anotherl but that would be for the good of the country. By contrast, the Canadian 
populous ~OUld not support a deal that they felt was less than ideal, since they were 
not convinced that the consequences of failure to achieve a new constitution would 
have a sig~ificant impact on their lives. 
Capada's case clearly demonstrates the point that the degree of consent 
required for constitutional amendment can go beyond that which is outlined in the 
amending fonnula of a nation's constitution. 
Political circumstances in Canada forced a reluctant federal government to 
institute a: referendum process to ratify a major package of constitutional refonns. 
i ' 
, 
The provihcial governments in Quebec, British Columbia and Alberta had already 
I · committej to holding referenda on the new constitutional package and it was 
considered politically unpalatable to give some Canadians, but not others, a vote on 
major chal[1ges to the constitution. Additionally, the fact that polling indicated support 
for the Acbord among a majority of Canadians gave the federal government reason to 
I 
believe that the outcome of the referendum could be a positive one. 
To be more precise, the 1992 referendum was not legally binding on the 
federal 
I 
I government, 
, 
, 
220Johnston,: 43. 
and is thus more appropriately tenned a plebiscite. 
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Word smithing aside, it is virtually inconceivable that the federal government could 
have disregarded the results of the referendum and proceeded with a constitutional 
package that did not receive widespread support from the Canadian populous. 
Although there was no set rule for what degree of support would be required, the 
general consensus was that a majority vote in both Quebec and the rest of Canada 
would be an absolute necessity and that it would be very difficult to proceed without 
majority votes in every one of the ten provinces. 
Although referenda were never a part of Canada's constitutional amending 
formula, it is now agreed by most commentators that the 1992 referendum "created a 
precedent: Canadians must be consulted directly before political leaders attempt to 
alter the country's basic document.,,221 Many analysts, while lauding this 
development as a positive step for democracy, see it as a potentially large stumbling 
block in future constitutional change for Canada.222 
A further complication for Canada is that while a national referendum has 
been added to the amending formula through precedent, the formula that appears in 
the constitution requires the consent of provincial governments. For most 
constitutional provisions, either all of the provinces or 7 provinces representing 50% 
of the popUlation must agree. This means that any successful constitutional package 
must appeal both to the general electorate and to the provincial governments. Richard 
Johnston argues that the problem with this scenario is that it is unlikely that the 
electorate will accept any proposal that makes it through the ministerial process and it 
221Jeffrey Simpson, "The Referendum and Its Aftermath" in The Charlottetown Accord, the 
Referendum and the Future of Canada, Kermeth McRoberts and Patrick Monahan, eds. (University of 
Toronto Press: Toronto, 1993). 
222see Johnston, 43-48. . 
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[ 
is just as tlnlikely that governments would accept a package that the electorate would 
, 
be likely t? approve.223 
Sohth Africa did not find itself in this conundrum upon conclusion of its 
I 
I 
constitutio~al negotiations. The prospect of a referendum was discussed during the 
I 
negotiatio~s, however it was not selected as a ratification device. One of the major 
issues und~r discussion at Kempton Park was the issue of what mechanism would be 
employed ~o break constitution-making deadlock during the drafting of the permanent 
, 
constitutioh. It was decided that if the elected constituent assembly failed to approve a 
proposed constitution by a two-thirds majority, the constitution would be put to a 
national referendum, where it would be subject to a 60% threshold for approva1.224 
Rather than an ordinary ratification device, a referendum was seen as a means of 
breaking a:deadlock if the constitution-making process were to go awry. 
It ~s interesting that the negotiators chose to include in their interim 
constitutioh the requirement that a constitutional proposal lacking sufficient support 
I 
I 
from the elected members of the constituent assembly be submitted to the electorate 
for approial. This would seem to reverse the Canadian preceden~ whereby a 
constitutiohal package with the unanimous support of all 11 governments is then 
submitted L the public for ratification. 
Thl Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) also suggested the use of a referendum to 
ratify the lew constitution. The IFP suggested that the permanent constitution be 
I . drafted before an electIOn. The constitution would be submitted to all parties for 
i 
I 
approval aiId would then be subj ect to a referendum question during the first national 
I. 
vote. TheIFP argued that this process would be "more democratic, more pragmatic 
223Johnston, ;47-48. 
224 Atkinson, 100-10 1 
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and less conflict-prone." 225 The IFP's proposal would also have allowed even very 
small parties to block a constitution, since all parties would have to approve it before 
it was submitted to the electorate.226 The ANC and the SAG rejected this proposal 
in favour of an agreement that the permanent constitution would be drafted by an 
elected body. 
Ironically, the only referendum that took place during South Africa's 
negotiation of a new multi-racial democratic regime was a whites-only vote. When 
faced with a challenge from the right, F.W. de Klerk held a referendum in March 
1992 to secure a mandate from the white popUlation to negotiate. This has been 
viewed as a tactic that both gave De Klerk an unequivocal mandate to negotiate and 
made it easier for the parties to not submit the final constitution to a referendum 
(particularly to a whites-only referendum). As Ottoway argues, "it would be easier 
for the government to receive the approval of the white electorate on the basis of 
broad and vague principles than on the basis of a concrete constitution embodying 
inevitable compromises."227 The fact that the referendum was only on De Klerk's 
mandate to negotiate on their behalf and not on a constitution that would apply to the 
entire population, allowed the ANC to accept the referendum as a "whites-only" 
vote.228 Earlier in 1992, De Klerk had declared that the constitution would be 
submitted to a referendum in which white votes would be counted separately from the 
votes of other population groups, however this was forgotten in the wake of the 
March 1992 referendum victory. 
225Gavin Woods, Business Day, 12/2/93, as cited by Atkinson, 17. 
226Aktinson, 17-18. 
2270ttoway,161. 
228Ibid. 
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I 
ConstitutipnaUsm 
i 
100 
On~ of the results of the failure of numerous rounds of constitutional 
I 
negotiations in Canada is scepticism among the populous about the ability of 
! 
constitutiops to resolve conflict and the emergence of what has come to be known as 
"constitutibnal fatigue". Some observers have asked whether Canada's commitment 
i 
to constitutionalism is waning. 
Copstitutionalism has been defined as the belief "that the government to be 
instituted ~hall be constrained by the constitution and shall govern only according to 
its terms ~md subject to its limitations, only with agreed powers and for agreed 
1 
i 
purposes."1229 For the purposes of this study, another definition of constitutionalism 
will also ~e usefuL Stephen Brooks defines it as "the effort to find constitutional 
solutions ib some of the country's political problems."230 Both of these definitions 
emphasize: the importance placed on the constitution by the actors (including the 
populous, political elites and governments) of a given nation. 
In !Canada, the commitment to constitutionalism as defined in the first 
definition above has always been strong. The founders of Canada were united in their 
I 
concern apout unmitigated democracy. They sought to protect minority rights, 
I 
particularl~ language and religious rights. The BNA Act, 1867, contains provisions to 
I 
I 
I 
protect th~ both the use of minority official languages in Quebec and the rest of 
I 
Canada an~ the existence of denominational schools for religious minorities. 
, 
Sotth Africa has also demonstrated support for the concept of 
1 
constitutiohalism as a restriction on majority rule. One of the first principles to be 
I 
I 
established in the negotiations was a commitment to establishing a regime based on 
229Louis Hehl:in, as cited by Pierre J. J. Olivier, "Constitutionalism in the New South Africa" in South 
Africa's CriSIS of Constitutional Democracy: can the U.S. Constitution Help? (Washington: the AEI 
Press, 1994.119. 
. I 
I 
I 
I 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Chapter 5 - Comparative Analysis 101 
constitutionalism. This was by no means a foregone conclusion, since South Africa 
had operated as an authoritarian state for much of its history. The National Party, 
which emerged early in the negotiations as a champion of constitutionalism "had a 
history of cavalier treatment of constitutions. ,,231 The NP had by-passed the 
constitution in the 1950's to disenfranchise coloured voters and in the late 1970's had 
replaced the constitution, despite widespread existence, in order to introduce the 
controversial tricameral system. When it found itself on the brink of some form of 
majoritarian rule, however, the NP embraced constitutionalism as a means of 
protecting its minority interests. 
The ANC also demonstrated a surprising willingness to accept the principle 
that the decision-making power of the government would be limited by the 
constitution. Some observers have credited this perspective to the ANC's long-
standing commitment to political rule-making and its participation In a preVIOUS 
attempt (the 1955 Freedom Charter) to set out how governments may and may not 
exercise power.232 Doreen Atkinson argues that "constitutionalism was born out of 
the ANC's willingness to constrain majority rule, as long as the NP abandoned its 
demand for veiled racial privilege. ,,233 
Despite the commitment on both sides of the South African conflict to the 
general principle of constitutionalism, one of the major tensions during the 
negotiations was between the emphasis of minority rights by the NP and the 
insistence on majority rights by the ANe. South Africa's history dictated that the 
concepts of minority rights and majority rule would be politically charged to an extent 
unknown in Canada. 
230Brooks,271. 
231 Atkinson, 92. 
232Atkinson, 93. 
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In Canada, the major tension during constitutional negotiations has been a 
fundamental disagreement on the foundation of the intent and origins of the 1867 
constitution. It is seen by some as a "compact" between two nations, English Canada 
and French Canada, and by others as a "contract" between ten equal provinces. These 
opposing viewpoints colour how Canadians in different parts of the country interpret 
constitutional proposals. Regardless of their positions on the origins and intent of the 
constitution, however, Canadians have traditionally placed great importance on the 
constitution and support the idea that governments must be constrained by it. 
Where constitutionalism has been waning in Canada in recent years is in the 
belief that constitutional change is the best, or even a possible, solution to the 
country's political problems. Brooks argues that constitutionalism has not only failed 
in Canada, it has "exacerbated the problems it was supposed to solve.,,234 He 
contends that the process of constitutional reform became out of control in Canada 
when too much was demanded of the reform process from too many groups. Canada 
has now Come to a point where much of the populous has no desire to consider 
constitutional reform in the near future. Whether this "constitutional fatigue" is a 
temporary or an enduring feature of the Canadian political landscape remains to be 
seen. What is certain is that Canadian constitutionalism has evolved to a more 
populist form. Canadians are no longer satisfied to leave complt:x constitutional 
issues to their political elites. They expect to be consulted on major constitutional 
change and to have the final say on whether it is adopted. 
South Africa's constitutionalism does not appear to have saturated the South 
African populous to the same extent. In the drafting of their new constitution, South 
Africans were content to leave the negotiation to their political elites and to trust that 
233Ibid, 93. 
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consultation would take place within the political parties at the negotiating table. The 
fact that neither widespread public consultation nor a general referendum took place 
and that there was no publ~c outcry over the absence of these mechanisms is evidence 
that the South African population has embraced an elite-driven rather than a populist 
model of constitutionalism. 
The fact that South Africa is a new, unconsolidated democracy makes it even 
more crucial that the commitment to constitutionalism extends beyond political elites. 
In times of crisis, constitutionalism must run deep. As Olivier states, "the viewpoint 
that popular majorities should be constitutionally constrained is put to the test in the 
case of constitutional emergencies and political violence. ,,235 As long as South 
Africa's democracy remains unconsolidated, the commitment of the general populous 
to the principles set out in the constitution will be tenuous at best. There is a major 
education effort to be undertaken in South Africa to ensure that the population is 
aware of and supports the principles contained in the constitution. 
234Brooks, 271. 
2350hvier, 23. 
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i 
104 
CHAPTER SIX - CONCLUSION 
In light of what we have found about the reasons that South Africa succeeded 
; 
in reachin~ a negotiated constitutional settlement to its conflict, while Canada has 
i 
been unable to do so, it is worth turning briefly to the question of what the two nations 
I 
I 
can learn tom each others' experiences. 
What can Icanada learn from South Africa? 
Jat do these observations tell us about the way fOIVIard for Canada? 
Following the defeat of the Charlottetown Accord, there were essentially three 
schools oflthought in Canada with regard to the questio.n of how to proceed. 
Jeffrey Simpson, a syndicated political journalist, ably expresses the views of 
I 
I 
I 
one school of thought, 
I 
I 
"th~ most urgent lesson form the referendum, the previous 
co~stitutional failures, and the cleavages these efforts exposed is not 
th~t a new process, or this or that wording change or some new 
cOIilstitutional formula, or a rehash of an old one will produce 
co~stitutional peace, but that the search itself through the venue of 
formal constitutional change is too difficult, treacherous and divisive to 
be ~ttempted again."236 
The conclusion of proponents of this mode of thought is that the pressures 
facing Canada ca  be resolved without making constitutional amendments. The 
argument is that the amendment process itself is deeply divisive and should be 
avoided at all costs. This is essentially a rejection of constitutionalism and an appeal 
for conflict resolution by other means. 
Another school of thought is that an extended repneve from formal 
constitutional change is required to combat the "constitutional fatigue" that has 
236 Jeffrey Simpson, "The Referendum and Its Aftermath" in The Charlottetown Accord, the 
Referendum and the Future of Canada. Kenneth McRoberts and Patrick Monahan, eds. (University of 
Toronto Press: Toronto, 1993), 198. 
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befallen both the political elites and general populous in Canada. Proponents of this 
point of view argue that major constitutional change is simply not possible for the 
next several years, however they acknowledge that at some point, when it is 
confronted with a direct threat to national unity, Canada will once again return to the 
constitutional negotiating table. Peter Russell, for example, argues that mega-
constitutional politics will resume if Canada finds itself in a real, not an apprehended 
crisis of national unity. One scenario he proposes is that if the Parti Quebecois were 
to win a referendum on some form of sovereignty for Quebec, mega constitutional 
politics will resume and will take on a much more confrontational style than in the 
past.237 
Yet another school of thought contends that constitutional change is not 
possible for Canada because the demands of various groups are fundamentally 
incompatible and the Canadian electorate has not demonstrated a willingness to 
compromise their own perceived interests for those of the country as a whole. They 
argue that Quebec will never be funy satisfied with non-constitutional change and the 
Rest of Canada is not prepared to make the constitutional concessions that would 
satisfy Quebec's minimum requirements. Proponents of this point of view see the 
separation of Quebec as inevitable. 
A worrisome trend for federalist forces has been the growing sentiment 
outside of Quebec that perhaps everyone would be better off if Quebec decides to 
separate. Despite an outpouring of support and emotion from the rest of Canada 
during the 1994 referendum campaign, Canadians outside of Quebec have been 
reluctant to transfer their desire for national unity into constitutional concessions for 
Quebec. Although it is not voiced by the political elites, there is a section of the 
237 Russell, 1993(2), 36. 
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populatiori, particularly in Western Canada, that believes that enough has been done 
to satisfy Quebec's demands over the years and if Quebecers are not yet satisfied they 
should separate from Canada. 
As:pessimistic as these views of Canada's future are, we can not help but see 
hope in South Africa's experience. Intractable though Canada's situation may be, 
many observers felt a few years ago that South Africa's conflict would inevitably end 
in civil wa,r. Instead, South Africa reached a negotiated settlement. What can Canada 
learn from this? 
One of the lessons that Canada can take from South Africa's experience is the 
importance of negotiating the parameters for the actual constitutional negotiations in 
advance. ln Canada, it has been left largely to the federal government to informally 
consult with the provinces and decide upon the structure for negotiations. This has 
led to one :negotiation which was designed to ensure the greatest chance of reaching a 
compromise, but which entirely ignored the need for input from the general public, 
interest gtioups, and even senior government officials (Meech Lake). And one 
negotiation which was designed to ensure both compromise and public input, but 
which bee:ame forced into a messy - and eventually fatal - ratification device, a 
national referendum (Charlottetown). 
South Africa expended nearly as much time and energy deciding how the 
constitution would be negotiated, what the guiding principles of the constitution 
would be and in devising strategies for avoiding deadlock than in the negotiation of 
the constitution itself. It is this groundwork which Canada will have to pay strict 
attention to if it is to enter into another round of constitutional negotiations. It is not 
sufficient for the federal government to devise a structure for the negotiations which it 
feels holds the greatest chance for success. The negotiating structure, the scope of 
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issues to be negotiated, and particularly the ratification device to be employed once a 
settlement is reached, must all be the subject of extensive pre-negotiations with the 
presence of all negotiating parties and the input of interest groups and the public. 
These pre-negotiations must include what Pierre Du Toit calls "meta-
bargaining" or "bargaining about bargaining", which produces "ajoint commitment 
by all contenders to the view that the conflict cannot be won by either party on its 
own terms but instead, that a mutually profitable, and therefore mutually acceptable, 
settlement should be sought.,,238 Both Horowitz and Du Toit argue that this 
metabargaining process is essential in severely divided societies. 
What can South Africa learn from Canada? 
Although in conducting this study our primary intention was to find hints for 
Canada in South Africa's apparent success, we found in conducting the research that 
South Africa may yet face some of the same problems that Canada has dealt with. 
This leads us to the question of what South Africa can learn from Canada's 
experience with constitutional malaise. 
A major source of Canada's failure to achieve a constitutional settlement has 
been an unwillingness of the public, and even provincial legislatures in some 
instances, to ratify agreements reached by governments and political.elites. There is 
currently a discord between how elites perceive the conflict and the options for 
settlement and public attitudes. 
South Africa chose not to go the route of ratification by referendum and 
instead chose a relatively simple process of ratification through the national assembly. 
Although this ensured a swift end to the arduous process of reaching a negotiated 
238Du Toit, as cited in Horowitz, 34. 
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settlemen~, it may have consequences as South Africa's democracy consolidates and 
matures. 1rhere may be public desire to revisit components of a constitution that was 
! 
never fo~ally approved by the electorate. 
I 
As: much as the achievement of a negotiated settlement and the drafting of a 
new Constitution in South Africa was a "small miracle", it may not be a lasting one. 
" I 
In this essh we have argued that two of the most significant factors in South Africa's 
success wlre the perception of the grave consequences of not reaching an agreement 
and the flet that the constitution was not, submitted to a popular referendum for 
ratificatiol. These very success factors may create great problems for South Africa in 
I 
the future." 
Ab:eady there are signs of discontent and uncertainty within the New South 
Africa. the passage of the Constitution did not eliminate the sources of conflict 
i 
I 
within the' country. It entrenched some of the enormous changes that South Africa 
has undergone since the release of Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of the ANC. A 
Liberal Democratic regime based on majority rule with some protections for minority 
rights wa$ established on paper. Whether democracy will be consolidated and 
whether the institutions set out in the new constitution will be sufficient to contain any 
I 
future conflicts only time will tell. 
, " 
lrohically, if South Africa's democratic regime does become consolidated and 
if the conhict is suppressed for a considera.ble length of time, the conditions may 
! " 
become ripe for megaconsitutional politics to begin again. As the consequences of 
disagreement lessen and democracy takes hold, South Africans may begin to question 
the constitutional order and seek constitutional change. 
Sh0uld the time for major constitutional amendment arise, what can South 
I 
Africa lea~ from Canada's example? The first lesson should be that the degree of 
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required consent dictated by the amending formula is not always sufficient. Often 
political circumstances or historical precedents necessitate agreement beyond the 
constitutional amending formula. 
In Canada, the use of a national referendum as a ratification device for the 
Charlottetown Accord became a political necessity due to the public perception of the 
closed process leading to the Meech Lake Accord. Although referenda do not form 
part of Canada's amending formula, they are now a virtual necessity for major 
constitutional change. Additionally, the linkage of issues has made minor 
constitutional change virtually impossible in Canada. For the foreseeable future, any 
effort to negotiate amendments in one area will lead to the negotiating parties calling 
for amendments to other areas of the constitution, and thus a return to 
megaconstitutional politics. 
South Africa has tried to avoid the interprovincial battles that Canada has 
undergone by severely limiting the role of provinces in its amending formulae. This 
is indicative of a much weaker brand of federalism. Most sections of the South 
African Constitution can be amended without any provincial consent - with a two-
thirds majority of the members of the National Assembly. For Chapter 2 (Bill of 
Rights), provisions affecting provinces or the National Council of provinces, and 
Section 1, which stipulates the principles on which South Africa is based, are subject 
to approval by 75% of the members of the National Assembly and 6 provinces, as 
determined by a vote in the National Council of Provinces. If provinces develop into 
significant political units, it may become necessary - despite the formal amending 
formula - to ensure that most or all of the provinces consent to major constitutional 
change. It may be more important to secure the agreement of some provinces than 
others. 
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As! South Africa's democracy matures, the electorate may demand to be 
I 
consulted ~irectly on any future constitutional changes. The increasing significance 
of civil Lciety may also create a demand for consultation of organizations 
representilg certain interests. . 
In lummary, South Africa should be cognizant of the fact that although elite 
accommodation was an appropriate model for the negotiated settlement and new 
constituti1n, a more inclusive model may become necessary if constitutional 
amendment is contemplated. 
oJe of the greatest challenges to be faced by both Canada and South Africa in 
the future ls how to balance the democratic requirement to consult with the public on 
matters of!majOr constitutional change with the complications that public involvement 
can preseJt to constitutional negotiations. StUdying democratic transitions, Stanford 
universil Professor Terry Karl concludes that too much public involvement can 
result in 'I'birth defects",239 We would propose that the same may hold true for 
constituti~nal amendment. However, Canada provides evidence that public consent 
I 
can not beitaken for granted in the quest to reach compromise. 
I 
Implicatioins for Future Research 
At ithe beginning of this work we pointed out a number of limitations to this 
study, including the small number of cases, the fact that a single theoretical 
framework was applied and the need to isolate a manageable number of variables in 
extraordin~rily complex phenomena. These are common limitations of comparative 
works and! we have argued that despite these limitations it is possible to conduct 
239 Karl, 13~. 
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worthwhile research of complex phenomena through comparative research by 
focussing on a limited number of variables and raising research questions to be taken 
up by future researchers in order to complete the picture. 
Although the social-psychological framework is useful for the examination of 
the negotiations themselves, in order to answer the central research question, it was 
necessary to consider the relationship of political elites to the general public. The 
application of an alternative theoretical framework, allowing for a more direct focus 
on this relationship would undoubtedly yield further interesting results. 
Further comparative research involving other cases of constitutional 
negotiation, both success and un-successful, is also warranted. Nations like Canada 
that have struggled with constitutional deadlock for so many years are in danger of 
concluding that their conflicts are irresolvable. Through observing the experiences of 
other countries we can see that if the will is there on the part of the elites and the 
masses, "small miracles" can happen. 
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